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Chapter 1:   
Introduction 
 
Intertemporal decisions, which ask us, including people in rural areas in developing 
countrie, to trade off costs and benefits that incur at different points in time, are omnipresent. 
Most of our decisions today have consequences in the future, for example, the decisions to 
save money, to exercise or to study, etc. We often give in the temptation to choose the option 
that offers the smaller but sooner benefit rather than choosing the option that offers the larger 
but later benefit. For instance, we end up spending all salary without saving any cents 
although we planned to save as we got paid. This phenomenon can be theoretically described 
by present-biased preferences in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997). 
This model allows individual discount rates to decrease over time, which contradicts the 
assumption of constant discount rates in the discounted-utility model (e.g. Samuelson, 1937). 
The summary article by Frederik, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) finds that on average 
individual discount rates decline over time. Individuals, however, have different discount 
rates across a wide range suggesting heterogeneity of individual time preferences. 
In developing countries people in rural areas mostly live nearby natural resources such 
as fishing grounds, forest, etc. Many of them are classified as poor with regard to their 
financial situations. Their livelihood therefore depends tremendously on the natural 
resources. These people are not only the main users but can also be effective guardians of the 
natural resources. It is therefore important for the success of any conservation program that 
these local people engage in conservation activities. 
A decision to conserve natural resources or not is obviously also an intertemporal 
decision. For example, planting a tree requires trading-off short-run (opportunity) costs of 
planting and its long-run benefits. Despite the intertemporal nature of conservation the 
relationship between individual time preferences and conservation has been just recently 
investigated. Previous studies still provide contradictory results. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) 
report a negative correlation between present-biasedness and conservation among Brazillian 
male fishermen: the higher the present-biasedness the smaller the mesh or hole size of fishing 
instruments (which in turn means the less conservation). Torres-Guevara and Schlüter (2016) 
1. Introduction 
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find – contrary to Fehr and Leibbrandt – that present-biasedness is unrelated to conservation 
among Colombian male fishermen, but more patient fishermen with lower discount rates 
conserve less. Their proxy for conservation behavior is a fisherman-specific fishing impact 
index, which takes into account fishing instruments, methods and spots. 
It is therefore still crucial to study this relationship with a more direct measurement of 
conservation and a more detailed time-preference elicitation method. This will provide a 
more complete picture of how time preferences are related to conservation, which might help 
us to design a more effective conservation program in the field. 
Furthermore, it is hard for poor households in developing countries to save regularly 
because both the market and the state often fail to provide access to credit and adequate 
protection against income or expenditure shocks (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). It is also 
common among poor households that a household head is responsible for making financial 
decisions for the whole household, such as savings, loan taking or investments in new crops. 
It will be very useful to know whether the responsibility for other people can lead to different 
intertemporal decisions, in particular whether it can decrease present bias. 
Previous literature shows in other contexts that decisions on behalf of a group differ 
from decisions for oneself. Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007) show in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma that participants are more aggressive, i.e. strive for the largest payoff when 
deciding on behalf of a group than when deciding just for themselves. In addition, Sutter 
(2009) shows in the investment experiment that participants invest more in a lottery to have a 
higher probability of winning the lottery when deciding on behalf of a group than when 
deciding just for themselves. In other words, people try to get a higher payoff when they 
decide on behalf of a group than for themselves. This difference might also happen in an 
intertemporal context. Studying this phenomenon can give us another tool that can promote 
patient decisions when they are desirable. 
1.1 The scope of the thesis and its findings 
The thesis consists of three studies on intertemporal decisions of Thai coastal villagers 
and Thai university students. The research methods are lab-in-the-field experiment, field 
experiment as well as lab experiment. 
1. Introduction 
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Chapter 2 (Time preferences and field conservation decisions: Experiment in a Thai 
coastal village), joint work with Thomas Lauer, Bettina Rockenbach and Arne Weiss, 1 
investigates the relationship between time preferences and actual conservation decisions in 
the field. Planting mangroves is a conservation activity pursuing the long-term goal of 
sustaining the basis for fishing activities. The decision to engage in mangrove planting 
requires trading-off the short-run costs of planting with its long-run benefits. We report a lab-
in-the-field experiment with Thai coastal villagers in which we elicited short- and long-run 
time preferences prior to a mangrove-planting activity. We show that less present-biased 
participants plant more mangroves, but conservation is unrelated to villagers’ long-run 
discounting behavior. Members of savings groups tend to plant more than non-members, 
suggesting a positive spill-over effect from saving decisions to other intertemporal tasks, like 
our conservation task. 
Chapter 3 (The persuasive power of patience in groups: A lab-in-the-field experiment 
in rural Thailand), joint work with Thomas Lauer, Bettina Rockenbach and Arne Weiss, 
compares intertemporal decisions made for oneself and those made on behalf of a group. We 
conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with Thai coastal villagers. First, when participants 
decide for themselves, their choices are on average present-biased. Then participants decide 
on behalf of a group of three members and prior to this decision they are informed about the 
choices of their group members in the individual choices. Choices for the group are 
significantly less present-biased than the individual choices. We show that this result is 
driven by an asymmetric conformity bias: learning about more patient others has a stronger 
influence on choices for a group than learning about less patient others. 
Chapter 4 (Speaking of patience: The role of others’ preferences and communication 
in groups) examines whether decisions for oneself and decisions on behalf of a group in an 
intertemporal context are different among Thai university students. Participants decide first 
for oneself and then decide on behalf of a group of three members. I find that choices made 
for a group are significantly more patient than those made for oneself. This can be explained 
by the asymmetric conformity bias toward patience through two mechanisms: other 
members’ time preferences and communication between members. First, only more patient 
group members are influential for decisions for a group. Second, patient messages are most 
persuasive among all types of messages. 
                                                   
1 Thomas Lauer and Bettina Rockenbach: University of Cologne, Department of Economics. Arne Weiss: 
University of Oldenburg, Institute of Philosophy. 
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1.2 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis provides results and new insights that not only contribute to related existing 
literature but also offer possible policy implications. 
Chapter 2 contributes to the recent literature by using a proxy for conservation, number 
of mangrove seeds planted by each participant, that can measure the concern for conservation 
by both female and male participants more directly than previous studies. Time preferences 
are also measured in a more detailed way. The negative relationship between time 
preferences and conservation that we find suggests that short-term (opportunity) cost can 
hinder local people’s conservation. A conservation program that can help people to overcome 
present bias might be able to enhance conservation in the field. 
Chapter 3 and chapter 4 add to the literature by not just comparing intertemporal 
decisions made for oneself and those made on behalf of a group. But they also explain less 
present bias in decisions made on behalf of a group by the asymmetric conformity bias 
toward patience. Combining all new insights of this thesis, in order to enhance field 
conservation, one might consider letting representatives make conservation decisions on 
behalf of a group, e.g. each household head makes decisions for her household or a head of a 
savings group or a conservation group decides on conservation activities of the whole group. 
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Chapter 2:  
Time preferences and  
field conservation decisions:  
Experiment in a Thai coastal village 
 
 
Joint work with Thomas Lauer, Bettina Rockenbach and Arne Weiss 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Planting mangroves in tropical and subtropical tidal areas is a conservation activity that 
benefits the future environment (e.g., by providing nursery for aquatic animals, helping to 
prevent soil erosion and reducing carbon dioxide) and sustains the basis for fishing 
activities.2 The individual decision of the extent of engagement in mangrove planting requires 
trading-off short-run (opportunity) costs of planting and its long-run benefits. This 
intertemporal nature of conservation has stimulated research on the role of individual time 
preferences for conservation decisions.3 Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) study the relationship 
between present-biasedness and conservation behavior of Brazilian male fishermen. Their 
proxy for present-biasedness is the fishermen’s decision between a smaller amount of 
consumption goods now (at the beginning of their experiment) and a larger amount of the 
same goods two hours later (after the experiment).4 The proxy for conservation is the mesh 
                                                   
2 For the benefits of mangroves, see Kathiresan and Bingham, 2001. 
3 Conservation decisions also share a public goods character, which has been studied by e.g., Ostrom (1990), Curry, 
Price and Price (2008), Burks, Carpenter, Goette and Rustichini (2009) and Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom (2010). 
4 Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) speak of patience, as a more general description of time preferences. Because of the 
short duration between both points in time, long-run discount rates cannot plausibly explain why Fishermen might prefer a 
smaller amount now to a considerably larger two hours later. Therefore, the consumption decision ultimately measures 
present-biasedness. 
2. Time Preferences and Field Conservation Decisions 
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size of the fishing net or the hole size of the bottle that is used to catch shrimp.5 Fehr and 
Leibbrandt (2011) report a negative correlation between present-biasedness and conservation: 
the higher the present-biasedness the smaller the mesh or hole size. Torres-Guevara and 
Schlüter (2016) investigate conservation decisions of Colombian male fishermen. They 
measure present-biasedness similar to Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) and additionally measure 
discount rates by asking fishermen to choose between a smaller amount in one week and a 
larger amount in two weeks. Their proxy for conservation behavior is a fisherman-specific 
fishing impact index, which takes into account fishing instruments, methods and spots. 
Torres-Guevara and Schlüter find – contrary to Fehr and Leibbrandt – that present-biasedness 
is unrelated to conservation, but more patient fishermen with lower discount rates conserve 
less. Torres-Guevara and Schlüter explain the negative influence of patience on conservation 
with an indirect wealth effect: more patient fishermen have higher savings and therefore more 
likely invest in more efficient fishing instruments that catch more fish and thus conserve less. 
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with Thai fishermen which extends this 
research in important ways. Firstly, we extend the measurement of time-preferences. While 
Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) and Torres-Guevara and Schlüter (2016) measure present-
biasedness with one binary decision, we study time preferences in a more continuous way. 
Like Torres-Guevara and Schlüter (2016) we also measure both present-biasedness and long-
run discounting. Secondly, our experimental setup includes an independent conservation task, 
mangrove planting, that allows us to directly study participants’ conservation decisions. By 
counting the number of mangroves planted by each participant we obtain a direct measure of 
conservation activity, in contrast to e.g. Torres-Guevara and Schlüter’s (2016), who indirectly 
deduced conservation from a constructed fishing impact index. These novel aspects allow 
investigating how different degrees of time preferences correlate with actual conservation 
decisions. Moreover, we can address the inconclusive findings on the role of present-
biasedness on conservation. Thirdly, in contrast to the previous studies, our subject pool 
includes both male and female participants.  
Our lab-in-the-field experiment took place in the coastal village of Naithung, Nakhon 
Si Thammarat Province, Thailand. The village is located on the coastline of the Gulf of 
Thailand. The major economic activities are related to fisheries. We estimate the time 
preferences of coastal villagers based on the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 
                                                   
5 The larger the mesh (hole) size, the easier it is for small fish (shrimp) to escape. Thus, the larger the mesh or hole 
size, the higher the concern for conservation. 
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1997) by using the elicitation method by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). This allows us to 
elicit both the long-run discounting of an individual, i.e., how an individual discounts income 
between two future periods, and the present-biasedness (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), i.e., 
how an individual weights immediate income relative to income in future periods. In order to 
examine how elicited individual time preferences relate to conservation decisions, we 
organize a mangrove-planting activity on the dates participants pick up their experimental 
earnings. The amount of mangrove seeds a participant voluntarily plants is our proxy for her 
conservation decision. As this task is simple and not physically demanding, it allows us to 
observe the decisions of both female and male villagers of a wide range of ages. 
The village hosts several savings groups that manage savings funds to help its members 
financially. In general, members are required to save a constant small amount of money (e.g., 
around USD 1.5) every month into the fund. After having been a member for some time (e.g., 
a year), members are eligible for micro loans as well as micro health and life insurance. 
We find that less present-biased participants contribute more to the mangrove-planting 
activity and that planting decisions are unrelated to long-run discounting behavior. This result 
is robust to adding a control variable that captures membership in savings groups. Thus, our 
results support the findings of Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), who also use a rather direct 
measurement of conservation, and stand in contrast to Torres-Guevara and Schlüter (2016), 
who used the indirect way of the fisherman-specific index to measure conservation. 
Interestingly, members of savings groups plant weakly significantly more seeds than 
non-members, although membership in savings groups has no significant influence on the 
elicited present-biasedness and long-run discounting behavior. This suggests that 
membership in savings groups provides an educational effect that also spills over to our 
experimental conservation task. This spill-over effect underlines the importance of savings 
groups for sustainable development. 
2.2 The experiments 
 Elicitation method of time preferences  
We elicit time preferences through the convex time budget method (as used by 
Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger, 2015; Lührmann, Serra-Garcia 
and Winter, 2014). In this method, participants have to allocate a given budget to a sooner 
and a later date at different interest rates. There are three time frames: (I) today and two 
weeks later, (II) today and four weeks later, and (III) two weeks and four weeks in the future. 
The degree of present-biasedness parameter (𝛽) can be identified by comparing (I) and (III), 
2. Time Preferences and Field Conservation Decisions 
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as time frame I and time frame III have the same time span of two weeks, but the sooner 
payment in time frame I is immediate. The long-run discounting parameter (𝛿 ) can be 
identified by decisions in time frame III since both payments are in the future. The 
experimental budget is always THB 300 (around USD 9),6 which is the minimum daily wage 
in Thailand. The intertemporal budget constraint in each decision is therefore 𝑃𝑥% + 𝑥%'( =300, where 𝑡 is the sooner period; 𝑘 is the time span; 𝑥% is the budget allocated to the sooner 
date; 𝑥%'( is the budget allocated to the later date; and 𝑃 is a gross interest rate.7 There are 
five gross interest rates for each time frame, from 1.05 to 2.00, which corresponds to interest 
rates of 5% to 100% for two weeks.8 These are much larger than the market interest rate at 
commercial banks.9  
Table 2-1 summarizes all five decisions (rows in the table) for time frame I. The 
corresponding parameters are shown in the last three columns. The options stay the same in 
time frame II and time frame III, with only the timing of payments changing. For each 
decision, participants have to choose one favorite budget allocation out of four options. 
Option 4 gives participants the highest total payoff of THB 300, but participants have to wait 
to get the entire amount at the later date. Option 1 gives participants the whole budget at the 
sooner date but discounted by the corresponding interest rate. Option 4 is therefore the most 
patient option, while option 1 is the least patient option. All participants have to go through 
all 15 decisions, which are presented one at a time. 
Table 2-1: Decisions in time frame I (today,+2weeks)10 
No. Payment dates Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
𝑡  
(sooner 
date) 
𝑘  
(delay 
days) 
𝑃  
(gross 
interest rate) 
1 TODAY 285 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
2 TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
3 TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
4 TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
5 TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
Note: The last three columns are not shown to the participants. 
We implement a pen and paper experiment in the field. Each answer sheet is for one 
decision (a row in Table 2-1). Subjects see four calendars. Each calendar represents each of 
                                                   
6 USD 1 was equal to THB 32.62 when the experiment was conducted. THB stands for Thai Baht. 
7 See the full theoretical framework in Appendix A. 
8 For more details about standardized daily rate and annual rate of decisions in our experiment see Appendix B. 
9 The average deposit interest rate in Thailand in 2014 is around 2.00% (The World Bank, 2016). 
10 See complete decisions for all three time frames in Appendix B. 
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the four options. The calendars show clearly on what dates and how much money subjects 
will get. Subjects choose one favorite option by circling the number of their favorite calendar. 
Figure 2-1 shows an example of an answer sheet for the first decision. 
 
Figure 2-1: Example of an answer sheet 
After all decisions are made, one decision is randomly drawn to determine the 
experimental earnings. With this mechanism, all decisions are relevant for the payoff and 
income effects can be avoided. The show-up fee is THB 100 (around USD 3). Participants 
receive an additional THB 100 for answering the post-experimental questionnaire, which is 
announced after the experiment. It does therefore not influence choices made in the 
experiment. 
The issues that may turn participants reluctant to choose payoffs in the future are (1) a 
lack of trust that payments will be made in the future and (2) unequal transaction costs across 
payment dates. We address these concerns, for example, as follows: The researcher who 
conducted the experiment stayed in the village for two months before the experimental 
period. We asked the community leaders, who are trustworthy with regard to money issues, 
to announce the experiments for us. Furthermore, participants received a contract signed by 
us to guarantee their future payoffs. See Appendix C for more details about the procedure. 
 Mangrove planting as a conservation decision 
The main objective of this study is to examine the correlation between individual time 
preferences and conservation decisions. In order to observe actual conservation decisions, we 
organize a mangrove-planting activity.11 We select this activity for the following reasons: (1) 
mangrove planting is a simple task that everyone across genders and ages can do; (2) it takes 
                                                   
11 See Appendix D for pictures of the mangrove-planting activity. 
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a relatively short amount of time to plant a mangrove seed; (3) another cost of planting is, 
however, that it is hot and dirty; (4) the villagers know about the benefits of mangroves and 
how to plant mangrove seeds. 
The activity takes place on the days that participants come to pick up their experimental 
earnings. These dates depend on the random draw in each experimental session, which 
determines which decision will be paid out. Therefore, there are four planting days. We 
remind the participants through a phone call one day before their respective payment days to 
pick up their experimental earnings and inform them about the separate mangrove-planting 
activity. 
After participants pick up the experimental earnings, they are asked to go to the 
mangrove desk, which is located 15 meters away. Figure 2-2 illustrates the map of mangrove-
planting activity. The payments are timed such that only one participant arrives at the 
mangrove desk at a time. Once there, participants are asked whether they would plant 
mangrove at all and if so, how many seeds they would like to plant. The participants receive 
the mangrove seeds free of charge. Willing planters then take the chosen amount of 
mangrove seeds to the planting area. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Map of mangrove-planting activity 
 
To avoid that participants are influenced by reciprocity toward their experimental 
earnings, we tell participants during the phone call and again at the payment desk that the 
mangrove planting is a separate activity and that they should feel free not to participate. Our 
data soothes any concerns about reciprocity. There is no correlation between planting 
decisions and the earning from the time-preference experiment (See Table 2-2). We can also 
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rule out spill-overs from participants arriving earlier onto the decisions of subsequent 
participants. Trees block the line of sight between the mangrove desk, where participants 
make their planting decisions, and the mangrove-planting area. Participants can therefore not 
see how many mangroves have already been planted by others while they are making their 
own decisions. 
2.3 Results 
The lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted on February 21-23, 2015, in school 
classrooms in Naithung, Thailand. In total, 180 villagers took part in the experiment. One 
hundred and five participants (58%) were members of savings groups. Seventy-four 
participants (41%) were female. Ages ranged from 19 to 80 years old, with an average age of 
about 44 years. The experiment took around 80 minutes. An interview for the post-
experimental questionnaire took around 30 minutes. The total average earning was THB 
480.42 (around USD 16), which is about 60% higher than the minimum daily wage in 
Thailand. 
Out of the 180 villagers who participated in the time-preference experiment, 33 (18%) 
did not pick up their experimental earnings. Those who were absent do not differ from 
participants who came to pick up their experimental earnings in terms of present-biasedness, 
long-run discounting and earning on the planting day.12 To be conservative, we only use the 
data of the 147 participants who came to pick up their experimental earnings and made a 
clear choice about their contribution to the planting activity at the site.13 
 Measures of time preferences 
We use reduced-form measures of time preferences in order to avoid making 
assumptions on the utility function, which would be required if we estimated parameters (see 
Sutter et al., 2013 for an elaboration of this argument).14 Furthermore, this approach also 
allows us to have measures for all participants. 
The measure of present-biasedness is calculated as the difference between the averages 
of the five choices made for time frame III (+2weeks,+4weeks) and for time frame I 
(today,+2weeks). Both time frames have the same time span of two weeks, but the sooner 
                                                   
12 See the regression results in Appendix E. 
13 The results with all 180 participants are qualitatively similar. See Appendix G for the regression table with all 180 
participants. 
14 We also estimate parameters 𝛽. and 𝛿.	of the utility function. However, we cannot estimate individual parameters 
of participants who did not alter the choice at all, i.e., who always chose the same option across 15 decisions, since no 
variation in choices make it insufficient for the estimation. Our sample therefore is reduced by 55 subjects (out of 180). We 
show the parameter estimation in the Appendix F. 
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payment date is immediate in time frame I. If a participant is non-biased, then she chooses 
the same option in both time frames and the measure is consequently zero.15 If a participant is 
present-biased, she is more patient and chooses a higher option for time frame III than for 
time frame I and the measure is positive. The opposite holds for a future-biased participant. 
Measure of present-biasedness = Average choice in time frame III – Average choice in time frame I 
 
 
For the measure of long-run discounting, we use the average of the five choices made 
in time frame III (scale 1 – 4), in which both payment dates are in the future so that, by 
definition, present-biasedness does not apply. The interpretation is along the lines of a 
discount factor, where higher values mean more patience, so 1 represents the least patient and 
4 the most patient level. 
Measure of long-run discounting = Average choice in time frame III 
 
We observe variation in present-biasedness: 22.77% of participants are future-biased16, 
42.86% are non-biased and 35.37% are present-biased. The participants also differ in their 
measure of long-run discounting, with the highest fraction (31.97%) at 0, the most patient 
level. 
 Time preferences and field conservation decisions 
To answer our main research question, we now examine the relationship between 
experimentally elicited time preferences and our proxy for field conservation decisions, i.e., 
the number of mangrove seeds planted by each participant. Out of the 147 participants, 28 
(19%) do not plant any seeds. The modal choice, taken by 56 participants (38%), is to plant 
five seeds. 
We regress the number of mangrove seeds planted by each participant on the measure 
of present-biasedness and the measure of long-run discounting. We cluster standard errors on 
                                                   
15 The problem with this measure of present bias is that participants could be present-biased for some decisions and 
future-biased for others, leading to a bias of 0 on average. In our sample, there are few cases falling into this situation; 9 out 
of 63 non-biased individuals. Excluding these participants, results remain qualitatively the same. We therefore include them 
in the analysis. 
16 Future bias is also found in previous studies, e.g. Balakrishnan, Haushofer and Jakiela (2016), Giné, Goldberg, 
Silverman and Yang (2012), Takeuchi (2011). 
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the experimental session (see Table 2-2), as proposed by Fréchette (2012).17 We estimate 
Tobit models censored at zero, since 19% of participants who appeared at the activity decided 
not to plant. We find that present-biasedness is significantly negatively correlated with the 
number of mangrove seeds planted by each participant (p = 0.049 in model I). This means 
that more present-biased participants plant fewer mangrove seeds, which is in line with Fehr 
and Leibbrandt (2011). This result is robust to controlling for socio-demographic 
characteristics, planting day, and earnings from the time-preference experiment,18 as shown 
in Table 2-2 model II (p = 0.009). 
Table 2-2: Tobit regressions of the number of mangrove seeds planted by each participant 
Dependent variable   Number of mangrove seeds planted by each participant 
Model   (I) (II) (III) 
Measure of present-biasedness  -1.24** 
(0.62) 
-1.37*** 
(0.52) 
-1.22** 
(0.48) 
Measure of long-run discounting  0.72 
(0.90) 
0.74 
(1.07) 
0.69 
(1.09) 
Membership (dummy)    2.57* 
(1.37) 
Female   -4.56*** 
(1.23) 
-4.74*** 
(1.25) 
Age   0.13 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
Years in school   1.51** 
(0.67) 
1.45** 
(0.64) 
No. of children   -0.40 
(0.58) 
-0.50 
(0.59) 
Second planting day (dummy)   -1.62 
(2.70) 
-0.87 
(2.67) 
Third planting day (dummy)   -0.02 
(3.30) 
0.94 
(3.17) 
Fourth planting day (dummy)   -5.06*** 
(1.52) 
-4.04** 
(1.60) 
Earning from the experiment   -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Constant  3.22 
(2.49) 
0.98 
(12.19) 
0.52 
(12.12) 
/sigma  8.98 
(1.62) 
7.88 
(1.20) 
7.80 
(1.20) 
Log likelihood  -455.845 -437.889 -436.62 
Pseudo R2  0.0014 0.0407 0.0435 
No. of participants  147 147 147 
No. of clusters (sessions)   12 12 12 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered on session level in 
parentheses. There are 28 left-censored observations at 0 and 119 uncensored observations. 
                                                   
17 Although we randomly assign participants into each session and try to keep everything constant across sections, 
but other external factors in the field could influence decisions across sessions differently. As Fréchette (2012) discussed that 
there might be session-effects, so we run regressions with clustered standard error by experimental session. 
18 In order to control for the concern about reciprocity – that participants plant mangrove seeds to reciprocate the 
earning from the experiment. 
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The regression also shows a positive correlation between long-run discounting and the 
number of planted seeds, which, however, fails to be statistically significant (p = 0.42 in 
model I and p = 0.49 in model II). The sign of the coefficient suggests that, if there is any 
relationship at all, the participants who discount the future less (are more patient) tend to 
plant more seeds (recall that higher values of our measure of long-run discounting mean 
higher patience). This stands in contrast to Torres-Guevara and Schlüter (2016), who find 
fishermen with lower discount rates (higher long-run discounting) to harm the environment 
significantly more. 
 
Result: More present-biased participants plant fewer mangrove seeds. Long-run discounting 
seems to be unrelated to conservation decisions. 
 
 Time preferences, membership status in savings groups and field conservation 
decisions 
The negative correlation between the measure of present-biasedness and conservation 
decisions are still significant (p = 0.009) when we add membership of local savings groups as 
a control variable in the Tobit regression censored at zero (members: n = 95; and non-
members: n = 52), as shown in Table 2-2 model (III). Controlling for membership is 
important because members tend to be less present-biased and less future-oriented, though 
not statistically significantly so (means of measure of present-biasedness is 0.12 for members 
vs. 0.25 for non-members, Mann-Whitney rank-sum test: p = 0.14; means of measure of 
long-run discounting is 2.90 for members vs. 3.04 for non-members, Mann-Whitney rank-
sum test: p = 0.44). Interestingly, the model also suggests that members of savings groups 
plant more seeds than non-members, as the coefficient of the membership dummy is positive 
and weakly significant (p = 0.063). 
The regression also exhibits a strong negative gender and a strong positive education 
effect. The strong and significant negative effect of being female might be due to a cultural 
effect. Thai women dislike to be exposed to the sun and try to avoid it as much as possible. 
The strong positive and significant effect of education (years in school) is also remarkable. 
2.4 Discussion and conclusion 
In order to investigate the relationship between time preferences and field conservation 
decisions, we elicit the time-preferences of Thai coastal villagers and thereafter observe their 
conservation decisions in a mangrove-planting activity. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) find that 
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a less present-biased fisherman fishes in a more sustainable way, while Torres-Guevara and 
Schlüter (2016) find no relationship between present-biasedness and conservation, as 
measured by their fishing impact index, which takes instruments, methods and spots into 
account. Instead, they find a negative influence of patience on conservation, i.e. the more 
patient (lower discount rate or higher long-run discounting), the less conservation. To provide 
further evidence, we measure conservation more directly, i.e., by the number of mangrove 
seeds planted by each participant. We find a significant negative correlation between present-
biasedness and field conservation, which is in line with Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011). By 
contrast, long-run discounting seems to be unrelated to conservation behavior. Hence, it 
seems that despite not eliciting long-run discounting behavior, Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) 
did not leave out an additional important aspect of time preferences for conservation 
decisions. The results by Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) and us suggest that more patient 
individuals, in terms of their present-biasedness, care more about conserving the 
environment. However, the results by Torres-Guevara and Schlüter (2016) warn us that this 
may not necessarily translate into a lower overall environmental impact if being more patient 
also enables fishermen to be more economically productive. 
We also find that members of savings groups conserve weakly significantly more than 
non-members in our experimental conservation task. This result suggests a spill-over effect of 
savings groups on a real task that requires trading-off short-run costs and long-run benefits. 
Our findings suggest that such savings groups could provide double benefits to sustainable 
development: helping members to save regularly (Rutherford, 2001) and training them to 
resist smaller short-run benefits in exchange for larger future benefits even in pro-social 
intertemporal tasks, such as the conservation behavior studied in this chapter.  
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2.5 Appendix A: Theoretical framework of the time-preference 
elicitation method 
Present-biased time preference can be modeled with a simple functional form as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997).  
 (A2.1) 
where  is the discount function; 𝑘  is time period;  is a discount factor; and  is a 
parameter for present-biased preference with .  corresponds to the case of 
standard exponential discounting. The one period discount factor between the present and a 
future period is , while the one period discount factor between two future periods is . By 
including present-biased preferences into a standard intertemporal utility function, we get the 
following total utility function: 
 (A2.2) 
Assume a time-separable CRRA utility function19, in which the utility depends on the 
monetary payoff. In addition, there are only two time periods or dates that an agent has to 
allocate a given budget to (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Andreoni et al., 2015). The utility 
function has the following form: 
 (A2.3) 
where  is the amount allocated to the sooner date, while  is the amount allocated to the 
later date. The parameter 𝛼 captures the curvature of the utility function. 
Agents are assumed to maximize their total utility over time subject to the budget 
constraint, 
 (A2.4) 
where  is the gross interest rate,  is the budget. 
Maximizing (3) subject to (4) gives the following conditions: 
 
(A2.5) 
where  is an indicator for whether  Rewriting the equation by substituting 𝑥%'( = 𝑌 −𝑃𝑥% (from equation (4)) gives: 
                                                   
19 The CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function:  
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 (A2.6) 
This Equation (6) tells us that the higher present bias parameter 𝛽 and/or the higher 
discount factor 𝛿 leads to the higher fraction of the budget which is allocated to the sooner 
date 𝑥%. 
For parameter estimation, take log to equation (5): 
 (A2.7) 
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2.6 Appendix B: Design for time-preference elicitation 
 
Table 2-3: Design for time-preference elicitation 
 (sooner 
date) 
 (delay) 
days 
 (gross 
interest rate) 
Standardized 
daily rate (%) Annual rate (%) 
0 14 1.05 0.37 217.57 
0 14 1.11 0.76 714.41 
0 14 1.25 2.58 3598.47 
0 14 1.43 3.71 12564.12 
0 14 2 5.08 100479.55 
     
0 28 1.05 0.18 85.67 
0 28 1.11 0.38 226.29 
0 28 1.25 0.80 795.98 
0 28 1.43 1.28 2116.61 
0 28 2 2.51 11574.99 
     
14 14 1.05 0.37 217.57 
14 14 1.11 0.76 714.41 
14 14 1.25 2.58 3598.47 
14 14 1.43 3.71 12564.12 
14 14 2 5.08 100479.55 
 
Note: The effective annual interest rate is quarterly compounded. 
  
€ 
t
€ 
k
€ 
P
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Table 2-4: Complete decisions 
No. Payment dates Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 𝑡 (sooner date) 𝑘 (delay) days 𝑃 (gross interest rate) 
1 TODAY 285 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
2 TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
3 TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
4 TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
5 TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
         
6 TODAY 285 Baht 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.05 
7 TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.11 
8 TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.25 
9 TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.43 
10 TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 2 
         
11 in 2 WEEKS 285 Baht 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 14   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
12 in 2 WEEKS 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 14   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
13 in 2 WEEKS 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 14   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
14 in 2 WEEKS 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 14   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
15 in 2 WEEKS 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 14   AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
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2.7 Appendix C: Implementation of payments 
Stay in the field: We were introduced to the community leaders by the NGO officers 
who had been working in the area for over 10 years. Then, the researcher who conducted the 
experiment stayed in the village for around two months before the experiment period. During 
this period, the researcher conducted interviews with various villagers, so she was not a 
stranger to them. To avoid biases regarding that those participants knew the researcher, she 
told them that the payoff from the experiment came from a foreign granting organization. 
Announcement: The community leaders, who are also the committee members of the 
savings group, announced the experiment. They are trustworthy with regard to money issues, 
and assured participants that the researcher will pay as promised. 
Contract: Participants received a contract signed by the researcher, stating how much 
and on what dates they will get their payments. The researcher stressed to them that they 
could sue her if she does not pay them accordingly to the contract. 
Transaction costs: The show-up fee of THB 100 was divided equally and paid in cash 
on both payment dates to compensate for transaction costs equally across both dates. 
Delivery of payments: Participants received the “today” payment in cash after the 
experiment. For the “later” payments, participants were asked to pick up the payoff at the 
community shop by the pier, a location everyone knows and pass by every day. The 
travelling expenses and time to the experiment locations and to the community shop should 
be roughly equal for participants. 
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2.8 Appendix D: Pictures of the mangrove-planting activity 
 
  
  
Figure 2-3: Mangrove-planting activity 
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2.9 Appendix E: Regressions of absence for picking up the experiment 
earnings on the planting days 
OLS regression with standard error clustered on session level. The “Bootstrapped p-
value” column shows the p-values from wild cluster bootstrap resamples. All regressions 
suggest that time preferences and the amount of payoff on the planting day are not 
significantly different between participants who come and do not come to pick up their 
experimental earnings. 
Table 2-5: Regressions of absence for the planting activity 
Dependent Variable   Absence (binary) 
Model   Coefficient Bootstrapped p-
value 
Measure of present bias  0.02 
(0.05) 
0.62 
Measure of long-run discounting  -0.05 
(0.03) 
0.21 
Earning on the planting day  -0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.4 
Second planting day  0.03 
(0.06) 
0.67 
Third planting day  0.10 
(0.07) 
0.27 
Fourth planting day  0.10 
(0.06) 
0.18 
Constant  0.23* 
(0.11) 
0.05 
    
No. of participants  180  
No. of clusters  12  
R2   0.0375   
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at the 
session level in parentheses. "Bootstrapped p-values" columns report bootstrapped p-
values which correct for the small number of clusters following the procedures 
describe in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and Cameron and Miller (2015) 
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2.10  Appendix F: Parameter estimates of the utility functions 
The decisions made in the experiment are used to estimate the utility parameters, 
namely the utility function curvature, α, discounting, δ, and present bias, β. First, we use the 
ordinary least squares regression based on equation (7) as a linear model. However, there is a 
problem at the corner solutions that the allocation ratio ln 565678  is not well defined. To 
address this issue, the non-linear least squares regression, based on equation (6) as a demand 
function, is used to estimate the utility parameters. 
Nevertheless, for the estimation, subjects who did not alter the choice at all, i.e. always 
chose the same options across 15 decisions, are dropped out, since no variation in choices 
make it insufficient for the estimation. So, 55 subjects showed no variation in their choices. 
Estimates of parameters 
Aggregate estimates 
The aggregate estimates of parameters from decisions by the NLS regression are more 
evidence for present bias on the aggregate level. The aggregate estimate of β is 0.86, which is 
smaller than 1, and the difference is statistically significant (Wald test, p < 0.001). On the 
other hand, the aggregate estimate of δ is 1.00 and statistically not significantly different from 
1 (Wald test, p = 0.11). This suggests again that the longer time span in this experiment does 
not have an effect on decisions for oneself. 
The aggregate estimate of α, which captures the curvature of the utility function, is 0.66 
and statistically significantly differs from 1 (Wald test, p < 0.001). This indicates that the 
utility function is not linear, but concave. 
Individual estimates 
Figure 2-4 shows the distribution of estimates for β from choices by the NLS 
regression. While the peak is at 1, we can see that substantial numbers of participants have β 
estimates smaller than 1, which indicates present-biased preferences. Also, there are smaller 
numbers of participants whose β estimates are bigger than 1, indicating future-biased 
preferences. The individual estimates for β differ significantly from 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p = 0.072). 
Figure 2-5 shows the distribution of estimates for individual δ. The values concentrate 
well on 1 and they are not significantly different from 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 
0.801). This suggests that on average the estimate for individual δ is 1, which means that if 
earlier payment is not immediate, subjects value the later payment the same as the earlier 
payment. The time span has no effect on decisions. 
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Figure 2-4: Estimates for β from choices 
Note: Nine subjects are dropped out in this figure, since they 
have very high Beta. 
 
Figure 2-5: Estimates for δ from choices 
Note: Seven subjects are dropped out in this figure. Six 
subjects have very high Delta and a subject has a highly 
negative Delta. 
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2.11  Appendix G: Tobit regressions for the whole sample of 180 
participants 
Table 2-6: Tobit regressions of number of mangrove seeds planted by each participant for the whole 
sample 
Dependent variable   Number of mangrove seeds planted by each 
participant 
Model   (1) (2) (3) 
Measure of present-biasedness  -1.53** 
(0.77) 
-1.61** 
(0.69) 
-1.37** 
(0.60) 
Measure of long-run discounting  -0.02 
(0.85) 
-0.42 
(1.10) 
-0.41 
(1.11) 
Membership of a savings group 
(dummy) 
   5.03*** 
(1.63) 
Female   -4.10*** 
(1.37) 
-4.40*** 
(1.49) 
Age   0.08 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
Years in school   1.22* 
(0.70) 
1.09* 
(0.64) 
No. of children   -0.51 
(0.69) 
-0.71 
(0.68) 
Second planting day (dummy)   -1.67 
(3.14) 
-0.04 
(3.04) 
Third planting day (dummy)   -1.27 
(3.31) 
0.87 
(3.17) 
Fourth planting day (dummy)   -6.15*** 
(1.84) 
-3.76** 
(1.74) 
Earning from the experiment   0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Constant  3.00** 
(2.58) 
-15.00 
(13.26) 
-14.07 
(13.14) 
     
/sigma  10.00 
(1.72) 
9.08 
(1.40) 
8.84 
(1.39) 
Log likelihood  -491.14 -476.68 -472.38 
Pseudo R2  0.0016 0.0310 0.0397 
No. of participants  180 180 180 
No. of clusters (sessions)   12 12 12 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered on session level in 
parentheses 
 
Obs. summary: 
 
61 left-censored observations at decision<=0 
  
119 uncensored observations 
  
0 right-censored observations 
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2.12  Appendix H: Time Preferences incorporated in the standard public 
good model 
Present-biased preferences can be modeled with a simple functional form of the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting or the so-called 𝛽 − 𝛿 model (Laibson, 1997). When we plug it into a 
standard intertemporal utility function from consumption (𝑥%, 𝑥%'(), the total utility function 𝑈 in period 𝑡 takes the following form: 
𝑈% = 𝑢 𝑥% + 𝛽 𝛿(𝑢 𝑥%'( ,<(=>  (A2.8) 
where 𝑢(∙) is the utility function from consumption; 𝑡 is the present period; 𝑘 is the time 
span;  captures long-run discounting (a discount factor); and  is a parameter for present-
biased preference with .  corresponds to the case of standard exponential 
discounting. The one period discount factor between the present and a future period is , 
while the one period discount factor between two future periods is . 
We incorporate time dimension and time preference parameters of the 𝛽 − 𝛿 model to 
the standard social dilemma situation (adapted from the model in Kocher et al., 2016). This is 
the utility from the contribution decision in the present period 𝑡 to the public good from 
which 𝑖 can benefit in the future periods. 
𝑢% 𝜋. = 𝐸 − 𝑐. + 𝛽. 𝛿.(𝐺 ∙<(=> . (A2.9) 𝜋.  is an individual’s monetary payoff, which depends on the public good technology, the 
relative price of the private good, and on contribution costs to the public good: 𝜋. =𝑓(𝑐., 𝐺 ∙ ) and IJKILK < 0; where 𝐺 is the public good technology; 𝑐. ≥ 0 is 𝑖’s contribution to 
the public good from the available endowment 𝐸 and the rest is for the private consumption. 
Assume that every contribution is individually irrational (IO ∙ILK < 1), but collectively rational 
(𝑛 ∙ IO ∙ILK > 1). 
We investigate the relationship between individual contribution to the public good 𝑐.  
and time preference parameters (𝛽., 𝛿.) by looking at the partial derivative of the individual 
contribution level in present-biased parameter and in the long-run discounting behavior. 
The total utility in period 𝑡 from the contribution to the public good: 
𝑢% 𝜋. = 𝐸 − 𝑐. + 𝛽. 𝛿.(𝐺 ∙ .<(=>  
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𝜕𝑢%(𝜋.)𝜕𝛽. = − 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛽. + 𝛿.(𝐺 ∙ + 𝛽. 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐. × 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛽.<(=><(=> = 0 𝛿.(𝐺 ∙ + 𝛽. 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐. × 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛽.<(=><(=> = 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛽. 𝛿.(𝐺 ∙ = 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛽. 1 − 𝛽. 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐.<(=><(=>  𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛽. = 𝛿.(𝐺(∙)<(=>1 − 𝛽. 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐.<(=>  
With sufficient small number of periods (𝑇)  and/or sufficient small long-run 
discounting parameter 𝛿.  and/or sufficient small present-biased parameter 𝛽., ILKIVK is larger 
than 0, which indicates that higher present bias (smaller 𝛽.) decrease individual contribution 
to the public good. 𝜕𝑢%(𝜋.)𝜕𝛿. = − 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛿. + 𝛽. 𝑘𝛿.(W>𝐺 ∙ + 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐. × 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛿.<(=> = 0 𝛽. 𝑘𝛿.(W>𝐺 ∙ + 𝛽. 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐. × 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛿.<(=><(=> = 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛿. 𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛿. 1 − 𝛽. 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐.<(=> = 𝛽. 𝑘𝛿.(W>𝐺 ∙<(=>  𝜕𝑐.𝜕𝛿. = 𝑘𝛿.(W>𝐺(∙)<(=>1 − 𝛽. 𝛿.( 𝜕𝐺(∙)𝜕𝑐.<(=>  
With sufficient small number of periods (𝑇)  and/or sufficient small long-run 
discounting parameter 𝛿.  and/or sufficient small present-biased parameter 𝛽. , ILKIXK is larger 
than 0, which indicates that higher long-run discounting (smaller 𝛿.)  decrease individual 
contribution to the public good. 
The model thus suggests that as future benefits from the public goods are discounted, 𝑖 
contributes less to the public good, the more 𝑖 discounts the future. 
Proposition 1: Given constant long-run discounting (𝛿.), higher present bias (smaller 𝛽.) decrease contribution (𝑐.). 
Proposition 2: Given constant present bias (𝛽.), higher long-run discounting (smaller 𝛿.) decrease contribution (𝑐.). 
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in groups:  
A lab-in-the field experiment 
in rural Thailand 
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3.1 Introduction 
Intertemporal decisions, which ask us to trade off costs and benefits that incur at 
different points in time, are omnipresent. Often, we give in to a tempting short-term option 
instead of choosing a long-term option that offers a higher overall utility, evident from the 
regret we feel afterwards. For example, we plan to save tomorrow, but when tomorrow 
arrives we go on a shopping spree. Such self-control problems can be modeled as present-
biased preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model 
described by Laibson (1997). Whereas standard economic theory (e.g. Samuelson, 1937) 
assumes that an individual discounts different time periods at the same rate, the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model allows for discount rates to decline over time. A large body of 
work indeed finds evidence for declining discount rates (for an overview, see Frederik, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). 
The failure to save may be particularly detrimental for poor households in developing 
countries, in which both the market and the state often fail to provide access to credit and 
adequate protection against income or expenditure shocks (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). A 
“natural corrective” to a tempting present-bias may be that individuals in poor households 
often do not decide just for themselves, but for the entire household on, e.g., savings, loan 
taking or investments in new crops. There is ample evidence showing that decisions on behalf 
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of a group differ from decisions for oneself. Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007), for 
example show that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game participants deciding for a group are 
more aggressive than when deciding just for themselves. Sutter (2009) shows that 
participants in the investment game invest more in a lottery to have a higher probability of 
winning the lottery when deciding for a group than deciding for themselves. 
In this paper, we ask whether there is also a difference between decisions for oneself 
and for a group in intertemporal contexts. We study individuals who first take an 
intertemporal decision for themselves and afterwards for a group of three people. Prior to 
taking the decision on behalf of the group, participants are informed about the choices that 
the two other group members made in the individual setting. This setting allows us to 
investigate whether the information about other members’ time preferences is already enough 
to create choice shifts. Since Sutter (2009) finds that the difference between decisions for 
oneself and decisions for the group is amplified when group members are given the 
opportunity to communicate with each other via non-binding messages, we also study the 
effect of exchanging messages before the group setting starts. We conduct the lab-in-the-
field-experiment in the coastal village Naithung in Thailand with 90% of participants living 
in fishing households. The field setting has the advantage of providing a natural 
heterogeneity in age, income and time preferences among participants. 
We show that the participants deciding for themselves are on average present-biased, 
yet we also find choices to be significantly more patient and less present-biased when 
individuals decide on behalf of the group. We explain the choice shifts by an asymmetric 
conformity bias: more patient others have a stronger influence than less patient others. Yet, 
we find no additional effect of communication on intertemporal decisions for a group in our 
experiment. 
3.2 Related literature 
The literature so far offers little insights into factors that might create the difference 
between decisions for oneself and for a group in intertemporal contexts. The following 
models show that the intertemporal decisions of a delegate, who decides on behalf of the 
group, depend crucially on how other group members enter the delegate’s utility function. 
Jackson and Yariv (2014) model a delegate who fully takes the time preferences of group 
members into account. Therefore, a delegate of a group with, for instance, present-biased 
preferences on average will also take present-biased decisions. By contrast, Shapiro (2010) 
models a delegate as altruistic over payoffs (and not utility) of other group members. Such 
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delegate will take more patient and less present-biased decisions when she decides on behalf 
of all members than when she decides only for herself. 
Previous experiments comparing individual and group decisions in intertemporal 
context do not provide a clear result. Abdellaoui, L’Haridon and Parashiv (2013) and Shapiro 
(2010) show that group decisions are more patient and less present-biased. Yang and 
Carlsson (2016), however, find that spouses’ intertemporal decisions lie between decisions of 
husbands and wives. The closest in spirit to our study is the independent work of Denant-
Boemont, Diecidue and L’Haridon (2016). Here each student participant decides both 
individually and then in groups under majority voting. After four mock-voting rounds, the 
decisions in the fifth (and last) round determine the payoffs. Group decisions are calculated 
by the median of all members’ choices. Denant-Boemont, Diecidue and L’Haridon (2016) 
find that members converge their decisions toward higher patience and less present-
biasedness. Our study differs in regard to the group decision mechanism and the type of the 
subject pool. Most importantly, our study complements this literature by explicitly testing 
possible factors that lead to the differences between decisions for oneself and for a group, 
namely other members’ preferences and communication between members. 
3.3 Theoretical framework and expected behaviors 
We will first introduce present-biased preferences formally by briefly presenting 
Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2012) model. In order to capture the decisions on behalf of a 
group, we then extend the basic model by including other-regarding preferences. As we are 
interested in studying how delegates respond to different types of time-preferences of others, 
we allow for the possibility that the extent to which the well-being of others is taking into 
account depends on their time-preferences. 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) incorporate present-biased preferences into a standard 
intertemporal utility function. The total utility of a stream of consumption from the present 
period 𝑡 to period 𝑡 + 𝑇 into the future thereby becomes 
𝑈% = 𝑢 𝑐% + 𝛽 𝛿(𝑢(𝑐%'()<(=>  (3.1) 
where 𝑘 is the time span; 𝛿 captures long-run discounting (a discount factor) between two 
future periods; and 𝛽 is a parameter for present-biased preference with 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 1 . 𝛽 = 1 
corresponds to the case of standard exponential discounting such that the one period discount 
factor between the present and a future period 𝛽𝛿 is equal to the one period discount factor 
between two future periods 𝛿 . By maximizing this utility function subject to a budget 
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constraint Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) show that the higher the present-biased parameter 𝛽 
is and/or the higher the long-run discounting 𝛿 is, the higher is the fraction of the budget 
allocated to the sooner date 𝑥%. 
We then extend this model to capture the situation when a delegate’s decisions affect 
other members. Assume that a delegate decides for the whole group. The delegate’s decision 
is binding for all members and the delegate cares about the utility of the other members. The 
delegate then takes the utility of others into account with weights for each type of others. As 
the most general model for our set-up, we allow the weight that a delegate attaches to another 
member’s utility to depend on this member’s time-preference. For simplicity, we separate 
three cases: The other member is equally, more or less patient than the delegate. 
The weights for the other types could be the same or different across types. The 
delegate then maximizes the weighted discounted utility. As a result, the delegate might 
change the decisions when deciding for the group, depending on how the delegate weighs the 
time preferences of the different types of others.20 
Behavioral expectations 
The starting point is a purely self-oriented delegate who can be modeled by setting all 
weights of others equal to zero. This yields the null hypothesis that decisions for oneself and 
for a group are not different, neither on an individual level nor on average. 
In case that the delegate has the same weights greater than zero for all types of others, 
then she will behave like a (neutral) conformist. These weights yield the symmetric 
conformity hypothesis. It states that a delegate changes her decisions for a group in the same 
way toward the decisions of a more patient as toward the decisions of a less patient other. 
Symmetric conformity, however, does not change the average decision for a group compared 
to the one for oneself. This is because to the same extent that patient delegates become less 
patient and impatient delegates become more patient. In case that the delegate puts different 
weights to different types of preferences, the average decision for a group will differ from the 
one for oneself. We call this the asymmetric conformity hypothesis. To sum up, the 
symmetric conformity hypothesis predicts changes in decisions in the group setting on 
individual level but not on the aggregate level, while the asymmetric conformity hypothesis 
predicts changes in decisions in the group setting on both individual and aggregate levels. 
Communication among group members could decrease social distances between the 
delegate and other members. This could in turn lead to higher weights of others’ utilities 
                                                   
20 See detailed formal calculation and the model in Appendix A. 
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(Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996) and even stronger conformity toward others’ 
preferences when a delegate decides for a group. We call this the communication 
hypothesis. 
3.4 The experimental design 
We elicit time preferences through the convex time budget method based on Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012), Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015), and Lührmann, Serra-Garcia and 
Winter (2014). In this method, subjects split a given budget between a sooner and a later date 
at different interest rates. There are three time frames: the time between (I) today and 2 weeks 
later, (II) between today and 4 weeks later, and (III) between 2 weeks and 4 weeks in the 
future. The degree of present-biasedness (the parameter 𝛽) can be identified by comparing (I) 
and (III), while the long-run discounting parameter21 (𝛿) can be identified by choices in (III). 
The amounts allocated to a sooner and a later date in each decision already reveal 
information about the patience and present-biasedness of a decision maker. The more patient 
a subject is, the less she allocates to the sooner date. A person is present-biased if she 
allocates more to the sooner date in the short-run time frame (time frame I) than in the long-
run time frame (time frame III) for a given interest rate. The maximum experimental budget 
(𝑀) is always THB 300 (about USD 9 at the time of the experiment),22 which is the minimum 
daily wage in Thailand. There are five interest rates for each time frame, from 5% to 100% 
for two weeks.23 These are much larger than the market interest rate at commercial banks.24 
 Decisions 
Table 3-1 summarizes all five decisions (rows in the table) for time frame I 
(today,+2weeks). The corresponding parameters are shown in the last three columns. The 
options stay the same in time frame II (today,+4weeks) and time frame III 
(+2weeks,+4weeks), with only the timing of payments changing. For each decision, subjects 
have to choose one favorite budget allocation out of four options. Option 4 pays the highest 
total payoff of THB 300, but subjects have to wait to get money at the later date. Option 1 
pays the whole budget at the sooner date, but discounted by the corresponding interest rate. 
The sum payoffs over both dates increases with the option number. Option 4 is therefore the 
                                                   
21 Following Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015), we denote delta as long-run discounting parameter. 
22 USD 1 was equal to THB 32.62 when the experiment was conducted. 
23 See more details about the standardized daily rate and the annual rate of decisions in Appendix B. 
24 The average deposit interest rate in Thailand in 2014 is around 2.00% (The World Bank, 2016). 
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most patient option, while option 1 is the least patient option. All subjects have to go through 
all 15 decisions, which are presented sequentially one at a time. 
Table 3-1: Decisions in time frame I (today,+2weeks)25 
No. Payment dates Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
𝑡  
(sooner 
date) 
𝑘  
(delay 
days) 
𝑃  
(gross 
interest rate) 
1 TODAY 285 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
2 TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
3 TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
4 TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
5 TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
 Note: The last three columns are not shown to the participants. 
 
 Treatments 
All subjects are informed at the beginning of the experiment that there are two decision 
settings and that the rules of the second setting will only be explained after all subjects have 
finished the first setting. We next describe each treatment in detail. 
Group treatment (N = 90 subjects) 
To see whether subjects change choices when deciding for a group instead of just for 
themselves, we employ a within-subject design. In the first setting, subjects decide 
individually just for themselves. Subjects are given an answer sheet for each decision (a row 
in Table 3-1), which contains four calendars. Each calendar represents each of the four 
options. The calendars show clearly on what dates subjects would get which amount of 
money. Subjects choose one favorite option by circling the number of their favorite calendar. 
                                                   
25 See complete 15 decisions for all 3 time frames in Appendix B. 
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Figure 3-1: Example of an answer sheet in the group setting 
 
In the second setting, subjects decide as a group member for the group. They are 
randomly matched into groups of three members. One randomly selected group member acts 
as a delegate, whose choice is binding for all members. The random draw happens after all 
decisions have been made. To keep the identities of the group members anonymous, we use 
symbols to represent the members. Each group consists of a “Shrimp”, a “Crab”, and a 
“Fish”. Subjects make 15 decisions in each setting, which makes 30 decisions in total. 
In order to study how other members’ choices affect subjects’ choices for the group, 
before subjects make a choice for their groups we inform subjects about the options that the 
two other group members made for themselves in the individual setting. Figure 3-1 shows an 
example of an answer sheet in the group setting. In the answer sheet, the subject’s symbol is 
on the top right corner (a “Crab”). On the bottom right corner, subjects see the choices that 
the two other members made for themselves in the corresponding decision (as an example in 
Figure 3-1, “Fish” chose option 1 and “Shrimp” chose option 4 in the individual setting). 
Message treatment (N = 75 subjects) 
In the Message treatment, the experimental design is identical to the Group treatment. 
The only difference is that we give subjects the opportunity to exchange nonbinding free-
form messages once before the group setting starts. We therefore study how communication 
among group members additionally affects subjects’ decisions for a group on top of knowing 
other members’ preferences. Each subject sends one message to the two other group 
members. Hence, each subject receives two separate messages from two other members. 
Subjects can write down on a sheet of paper any kind of message, except revealing their 
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identity, threatening others or offering an outside option. We tell them to write about 
decisions in the game, for instance suggestions for other members, their own choices in the 
individual setting or their intended choices in the group setting. All participants followed 
these instructions. 
Remember that in this treatment subjects can observe other group members’ choices in 
the individual setting before making every (of the 15) decision for the group as in the Group 
treatment. Additionally, subjects receive two separate messages from the other two members 
once before the group setting kicks of. Therefore each subject is informed about other group 
members through two channels: other members’ choices in the individual setting (revealed 
preferences) and messages. 
Control treatment (N = 15 subjects) 
In order to control for possible learning effects between the individual setting and the 
subsequent group setting, we run a control treatment, in which subjects decide in the 
individual setting twice. 
 Payment 
In order to determine payments, one out of 30 decisions is randomly drawn. In case a 
decision from the individual setting is drawn, subjects receive payoffs according to their own 
choices. In case a decision from the group setting is drawn, a delegate is drawn randomly. 
The delegate’s choice then determines the payoffs for all three group members. Subjects are 
informed that any of their choices can determine their payoff and that this will be determined 
by a random draw. With this mechanism, all decisions are relevant for the payoff, and income 
effects can be avoided. 
The show-up fee is THB 100 (around USD 3). In addition, subjects receive THB 100 
for answering a post-experimental questionnaire, which is announced after the experiment. 
We follow the payment procedure described in Appendix C to eliminate the concerns that the 
subjects could be reluctant to choose future payment due to (1) trust in future payment and 
(2) unequal transaction cost across payment dates. For example, the trustworthy community 
leaders announced the experiment for us. We signed a contract for the future payments for 
the subjects. 
 Procedure 
The participants of our study are villagers of Naithung village, in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat province, Thailand. The village is located along the coastline of the Gulf of 
Thailand. The major economic activities in the area are all related to fisheries, such as fishing 
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with their own boats, selling fish, making fish nets, working on boats, etc. In general, 
fishermen households find it hard to have long-term savings (Chuaychoo, 2002). 
The lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted on 21-23 February 2015 in school 
classrooms in Naithung. In total, 180 villagers participated in the experiment, of which 63% 
were fisherman and 90% lived in fishing households. One hundred and five participants 
(58%) were members of savings groups and 41% were female. Participants’ age ranged from 
19 to 80 years old, with an average age of 44 years. The experiment took between 60 and 80 
minutes, depending on the treatment. An interview for the post-experimental questionnaire 
took around 30 minutes. The total average earning was THB 480.42 (about USD 16), which 
was around 60% larger than the minimum daily wage in Thailand. 
 Measures of (revealed) time preferences 
First, we look at the actual choices. We then use reduced-form measures of time 
preferences in order to avoid having to make assumptions on the utility function. This would 
be required if we estimated parameters in a structural-model framework (see Sutter et al., 
2013 for an elaboration of this argument). This approach also allows us to calculate measures 
for all participants.26 
The measure of present-biasedness is calculated as the difference between the average 
of the five choices made for time frame III (+2weeks,+4weeks) and the average of the five 
choices made for time frame I (today,+2weeks). Both time frames have the same time span of 
two weeks, but the sooner payment date is immediate in time frame I. If a participant is non-
biased, then she chooses the same option in both time frames, and the measure is zero.27 If a 
participant is present-biased, she is more patient for time frame III and chooses the higher 
options, which turns the measure positive. The opposite holds for a future-biased participant. 
Measure of present-biasedness = Average choice in time frame III – Average choice in time frame I 
 
                                                   
26 We also estimate parameters 𝛽. and 𝛿.	of the utility function based upon Equations (A3.6) and (A3.7). However, 
we cannot estimate individual parameters of those participants who did not alter the choice at all across 15 decisions, since 
no variation in choices make it insufficient for the estimation. For decisions for oneself, our sample is reduced by 55 subjects 
(out of 180). For decisions for a group, the sample is additionally reduced by 25 subjects. The main results of this method 
are not different from using the actual choices and reduced-form measures. Appendix D shows our results for this 
estimation. 
27  The problem with this measure of present-biasedness is that participants could be present-biased for some 
decisions and future-biased for others, leading to no bias on average. In our sample, there are few cases falling into this case: 
10 out of 72 non-biased participants in the individual setting and 11 out of 92 non-biased participants in the group setting. 
Excluding these participants, results remain qualitatively the same. Thus, we include them in the analysis. 
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The measure of long-run discounting is calculated as the average of the five choices 
made in time frame III, in which both payment dates are in the future. Therefore, only long-
run discounting matters but not present bias. 
Measure of long-run discounting = Average choice in time frame III (scale 1 – 4) 
 
3.5 Results 
In order to check whether the participants understood the experiment, we first look at 
the rationality of choices. Choices are rational according to the law of demand if participants 
allocate less to the sooner date when the interest rate increases, which means choosing a 
higher option. As it turns out, the vast majority of choices is consistent with the law of 
demand: Their share is 79.77% of all choices made for oneself and 85.51% of choices made 
for a group. We include all decisions in the analysis since all main results stay qualitatively 
the same when excluding the irrational choices. 
 Individual time preferences 
Figure 3-2 shows the mean share of budget allocated to sooner dates in time frame I 
(today,+2weeks) and time frame III (+2weeks,+4weeks), the short-run and long-run time 
frames with the same time span. The mean share of budget allocated to sooner dates 
decreases with higher interest rates, which is in line with the law of demand. For every given 
interest rate the mean share of budget allocated to the sooner date in the short-run time frame 
is higher than in the long-run time frame. This means that participants choose less patiently 
when the sooner date is immediate. On average the participants allocate 41% of the budget to 
sooner date if the sooner date is today (time frame I) but only 34% if the sooner date is in two 
weeks (time frame III). The average choices for time frame I and time frame III are 
significantly different (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01). On the individual level, 19.39% 
of participants are future-biased, 40.61% are non-biased and 40% are present-biased. These 
shares are in line with findings reported in previous studies, e.g. Balakrishnan, Haushofer and 
Jakiela (2016), Giné, Goldberg, Silverman and Yang (2012) and Takeuchi (2011). 
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Figure 3-2: Mean share to sooner dates in time frame I and time frame III 
 
Result 1: Participants are present-biased on average when they decide only for themselves in 
the individual setting. 
 
Regarding long-run discounting behavior, the average share of budget to the sooner 
date when the sooner date is in two weeks (time frame III) is 34%, which is significantly 
larger than 0% (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.01). This suggests that the participants are 
on average discounting long-term payments. 
 Messages 
The exchanged messages have been coded separately by two research assistants. In 
case of distinct coding they discussed and reached an agreement. The categories used are the 
following. Message M1 suggests other members to be patient and get the highest sum of 
money at the later dates. This message is sent by around 39% of participants. Message M2 is 
neutral, i.e., tells other members to feel free to choose their preferred option for the group. 
This message is written by about 21% of participants. Message M3 proposes others to be 
impatient and get money today despite the lowest sum. Message M4 suggests income 
smoothing, i.e., choosing the intermediate options that give participants payoffs on both 
payment dates. M3 and M4 are each suggested by 20% of participants. We investigate the 
effect of received messages on the changes in choices (in the group setting from the 
individual setting) and do not find any significant effect of any type of messages. Neither do 
we find an overall difference between the Group and Message treatments. See Appendix E 
for the regression results. 
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As each participant receives two separate messages from two other members, there are 
several combinations of message types participant can get. Therefore, we use simplified 
categories that capture those combinations. We consider the message types either as neutral 
or strategic relatively to the choice that participants have made in the individual setting, i.e., 
more patient, less patient, equally patient. The alternative categories of received messages are 
as follows. ‘All more patient messages’ is when participants receive two messages that try to 
convince them to be more patient for the group than they were for themselves (12% of all 
decisions in Message treatment). ‘All less patient messages’ is when both messages suggest 
receivers to be less patient (4.4% of all decisions in Message treatment). ‘One more patient 
and one less patient messages’ is when receivers get one message suggesting a more patient 
option and the other suggesting a less patient option (4.1%). ‘One equally patient and one 
more patient messages’ is when one message mentions the equally patient option and the 
other suggests a more patient option (13.2%), while ‘One equally patient and one less patient 
messages’ is when the other suggests a less patient option (13.8%). ‘One neutral and one 
more patient messages’ is when one message does not make any suggestion and the other 
prefers a more patient option (12.4%), while ‘One neutral and one less patient messages’ is 
when the other prefers a less patient option (11.7%). Lastly, ‘Neutral and equally patient 
messages’ is when received messages are either neutral or equally patient to the participant’s 
choices (28.4%). We examine the effects of such message types on changes in choices (in the 
group setting from the individual setting) but do not find any significantly effect of messages 
and the overall Message treatment. See regression results in Appendix E. 
We therefore decided to pool data from the Group and Message treatments (N = 165 
participants) to increase statistical power in the later analysis. We will henceforth refer to this 
pooled dataset as “Main treatment”. 
 Comparison of choices for oneself and for a group 
In this section, we compare choices for oneself and for a group. For this analysis, we 
first look at choices of the participants in the Main treatment, who enter the group setting 
after the individual setting. 
Table 3-2 (column 1) shows that overall participants choose significantly more patient 
options when deciding on behalf of a group than when deciding for themselves (means are 
2.94 and 2.85, respectively; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01). Looking separately for 
each time frame, participants choose more patient options for a group than for themselves in 
time frame I (today,+2weeks) (means are 2.93 and 2.78 in the group and individual settings; 
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Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01). In time frame III (+2weeks,+4weeks), by contrast, 
there is no difference between the group setting and the individual setting (means are 3.00 
and 2.98 in the group and individual settings; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.41). 
Consequently, the elicited present-biasedness reduces on average. Choices made for a group 
in time frame II (+2weeks,+4weeks) are weakly significantly more patient compared to 
choices for oneself (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.08). 
The measure of present-biasedness in the group setting converges toward 0, reducing 
the share of both present-biased and future-biased participants compared to the individual 
setting (Figure 3-3). The distribution of present-biasedness is consequently significantly 
different between the individual and the group settings (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.02). 
We also find the extent of the bias to be significantly smaller in the group setting for both 
present-biased and future-biased individuals (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01 in both 
cases). 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Measure of present-biasedness from choices for oneself and on behalf of a group in the 
main treatment 
 
Given that, on average, participants in the individual setting are present-biased, the 
convergence in the group setting toward non-biasedness reduces the average present-
biasedness in the group setting (means of the measure of present-biasedness are 0.20 in the 
individual setting and 0.06 in the group setting; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.01). 
Regarding long-run discounting, participants do not discount differently in both settings 
(means of the measure of long-run discounting behavior are 3.00 in the individual setting and 
2.98 in the group setting; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.94). 
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Table 3-2: Difference of means of options chosen in the second setting and the first setting 
 (1) Main (2) Control  
Overall 0.08*** -0.13 
Time frame I (today,+2weeks) 0.16*** 0.05 
Time frame II (today,+4weeks) 0.07* -0.28 
Time frame III (+2weeks,+4weeks) 0.02 -0.53 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Wilcoxon signed-rank test between 
choices in both settings. 
 
We then analyze changes between choices made in both individual settings in the 
control treatment in order to test whether or not the difference between choices made in the 
individual and the group settings in the Main treatment are due to a repetition effect. In the 
control treatment, participants do not choose different options overall and in any of the time 
frames (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-values are 0.23, 0.85, 0.19, 0.40, respectively). These 
results show that participants do not “learn” to choose more patient options when they decide 
just for themselves for the second time. If at all, they tend to make less patient choices (Table 
3-2, column 2). Regarding long-run discounting, participants in the control treatment do not 
discount differently either (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.40). 
Result 2: Participants choose more patient options and are less present-biased when they 
decide for a group than when they decide just for themselves. 
 Effects of other group members’ choices 
We now try to explain why choices in the group setting are more patient options 
compared to those in the individual setting. From this point we focus on the actual choices 
made overall. As discussed earlier, exchange of messages between group members per se (in 
the message treatment) does not explain the difference between choices in the individual and 
group settings. We therefore turn to the question of how choices of others influence one’s 
own choice for the group. To do so, we need to compare situations where participants took 
similar decisions in the individual setting but were exposed to different revealed preferences 
of other members in the group setting. The random composition of the groups provides 
exogenous variation in others’ types. Since we are interested in whether and how participants 
take choices of others into account when deciding for a group, we look at types in relative 
terms, i.e., whether other group members are more, equally or less patient. 
We start by focusing on the intermediate options (option 2 and option 3) chosen in the 
individual setting. Table 3-3 shows the effects of others’ choices (in the individual setting) on 
one’s own choice for the group when the intermediate options are chosen in the individual 
setting. The explanatory variables are five dummies representing five combinations of others’ 
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types. The base category is when all members are equally patient, i.e., all choose the same 
option in the individual setting. 
Controlling for one’s own choice in the individual setting, interest rate, and for other 
characteristics, participants are significantly more likely to adjust their choices for a group to 
a more patient option when other members are more patient compared to the base case and 
also when one other member is more patient and the other member is less patient. By 
contrast, we find no evidence of conformity toward less patient others. These findings firstly 
indicate that in the group setting a more patient other influences the choice shift toward a 
more patient direction. Secondly, a more patient other has more weight than a less patient one 
on choices for a group. The descriptive statistics in Table 3-10 (Appendix F) suggests the 
qualitatively similar results. 
Table 3-3: OLS regressions of changes in choices in the group setting for situations when options 2 
and 3 were chosen in the individual setting 
Dependent Variable  Changes in choices 
Model  (I) (II) 
All 'more patient' others (dummy)  0.33** 
(0.13) 
0.33*** 
(0.13) 
All 'less patient' others (dummy)  0.06 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.15) 
One 'more patient' and one 'less patient' others (dummy)  0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
One 'more patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy)  0.24** 
(0.11) 
0.23* 
(0.12) 
One 'less patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy)  0.12 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
Option 3 chosen (dummy)  -0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.38*** 
(0.08) 
Interest rate  0.70*** 
(0.22) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
Age   -0.001 
(0.005) 
Female   0.07 
(0.11) 
Years in school   -0.003 
(0.02) 
Membership of savings groups (dummy)   -0.06 
(0.10) 
Constant  0.70*** 
(0.22) 
0.86* 
(0.44) 
    
No. of groups  52 52 
No. of observations  955 955 
R2  0.0780 0.0815 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the group 
level in parentheses. 
 
3. The Persuasive Power of Patience in Groups 
 43 
Next we analyze situations where participants choose either the least patient option 
(option 1) or the most patient option (option 4) in the individual setting. In the former case, 
participants cannot choose any less patiently in the group setting, nor could others have 
chosen less patiently than the participants in the individual setting. In the latter case, the 
reverse holds true: Participants cannot become more patient in the group setting and other 
group members cannot have chosen more patiently than the participants. We therefore run 
two separate regressions for both cases of the changes in choices (from the individual setting 
to the group setting) on the difference between participants’ choice and an average of other 
members’ choices in the individual setting. The regression results in Table 3-4 (I) and (II) 
show that when the least patient option was chosen (in the individual setting) the magnitude 
of changes in choices (in the group setting) toward a more patient option increases, the more 
patient the other members (in the individual setting) are on average. Table 3-4 (III) and (IV) 
suggest that when the most patient option was chosen (in the individual setting), the choice in 
the group setting is not changed toward a less patient option when others are on average less 
patient (in the individual setting). These results suggest that the more patient others tend to 
have more influence than the less patient others on choices for the group. The descriptive 
statistics in Table 3-11 and Table 3-12 (Appendix F) support these results. 
Table 3-4: OLS regressions of changes in choices in the group setting for situations when the least or 
the most options were chosen in the individual setting 
Dependent variable 		
Changes in choices: 
Option 1 (least patient) 
  Changes in choices: 
Option 4 (most patient) 
Model  (I) (II)  (III) (IV) 
Difference between the average of others' 
choices and one's own choice 
 0.24** 
(0.11) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
 0.05 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Interest rate  -0.07 
(0.22) 
-0.13 
(0.23) 
 0.20*** 
(0.07) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
Age   0.03 
(0.01) 
  -0.02*** 
(0.006) 
Female   -0.12 
(0.18) 
  -0.03 
(0.10) 
Years in school   0.11* 
(0.05) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
Membership of savings groups (dummy)   0.01 
(0.22) 
  0.28*** 
(0.08) 
Constant  0.42 
(0.28) 
-1.38 
(0.77) 
 -0.57*** 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.27) 
       No. of groups  46 46  52 52 
No. of observations  472 472  1048 1048 
R2   0.0393 0.0934   0.0164 0.0691 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered on group level in 
parentheses. 
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Result 3: Other members’ preferences affect one’s own choices for the group. A more patient 
other member has more influence on one’s own choice for the group than a less patient other. 
By analyzing cases in which all members are equally patient, we can further answer the 
question whether the mere responsibility of deciding for a group already changes decisions. 
This does not seem to be the case. The descriptive statistics in Table 3-10 (Appendix F) 
shows that when the intermediate options were chosen in the individual setting, 81% of all 
choices that fall in this category stay unchanged. The remaining choices are equally shifted to 
a more or a less patient direction, each with 8% of all choices that fall in this category. In 
case that the least patient option (option 1) was chosen in the individual setting, 88% of all 
choices that fall in this category remain unchanged. While the fraction of unchanged choices 
is 91% in case that the most patient option (option 4) was chosen in the individual setting. 
This result emphasizes the importance of other members’ time-preferences rather than of 
responsibility for others alone. 
Result 4: Having responsibility for others does not by itself change choices for a group. 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study compares intertemporal decisions for oneself and for a group. Then the 
effects of other members’ time preferences on choices in the group setting are investigated. 
We examine also how communication additionally affects choices for a group on top of other 
members’ time preferences. We find that when the participants decide for a group, they are 
less present-biased on average. The descriptive statistics and regression results show that the 
others’ preferences affect the changes in choices in the group setting, but not the 
communication between group members. Meanwhile, the participants do not change their 
choices for a group (from choices for themselves) when the other members choose the same 
choices as they did for themselves. This result suggests that people take into account the 
preferences of those for whom they have responsibility rather than maximizing payoffs for 
the whole group (choosing the most patient option). 
The participants show a bias toward patience when deciding for a group, which is 
consistent with the asymmetric conformity hypothesis. The bias in conformity that we find 
may be rooted in the social desirability of patience, as patience is a desirable trait in many 
cultures, considered a virtue by many philosophers, local proverbs, and demanded by 
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religious’ prescriptions. 28  This explanation connects to another instance of asymmetric 
conformity, toward risk aversion, as reported by Bolton, Ockenfels and Stauf (2015) as both 
risk aversion and patience might be considered socially desirable behaviors. Bolton, 
Ockenfels and Stauf (2015) find that subjects become more risk-averse when they are 
responsible for the payoff of a passive player. Decision makers tend to adjust their decisions 
toward risk aversion when they learn that a passive player is more risk-averse. On the other 
hand, decision makers do not adjust their decisions when a passive player is less risk-averse. 
This indicates that decision-makers may conform asymmetrically toward the preferences of 
others. For more understanding about conformity in intertemporal contexts, the next step 
could be to study the effect of other members’ preferences on decisions for oneself. This can 
again help disentangle the effects of other members’ decisions and responsibility for the 
group. 
Yet the communication has no significant effect on the changes in choices in the group 
setting from the individual setting on top of learning about the revealed preferences of other 
group members, which is contradictory to the communication hypothesis. This shows that 
learning about preferences of other group members gives the participants sufficient 
information to make decisions for the group. This finding, however, could be driven by the 
high proportion (28.4%) of participants who receive neutral and equally patient messages, 
which do not propose any other option than participants’ own choices. 
Our findings suggest that we might consider encouraging someone to make 
(intertemporal) decisions on behalf of a group in situations in which patience is desirable. For 
example, we could ask a household head to decide on the household monthly savings plan 
instead of asking each household member to make their own savings plan separately.  
                                                   
28 In the Bible, it is stated, for example, that “Be patient toward all men”. Buddha said also, for example, “And 
invulnerable armor is patience”. Proverbs from different parts of the world tell people to be patient. For instance, a German 
proverb says, “Patience is a bitter plant, but it has sweet fruit”. A Chinese proverb says, “Patience and the mulberry leaf 
becomes a silk gown”, and a Kanuri proverb says, “At the bottom of patience is heaven”. 
3. The Persuasive Power of Patience in Groups 
 46 
3.7 Appendix A: The theoretical framework 
Present-biased time preference can be modeled with a simple functional form as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997).  
 (A3.1) 
where  is the discount function; 𝑘  is time period;  is a discount factor; and  is a 
parameter for present-biased preference with .  corresponds to the case of 
standard exponential discounting. The one period discount factor between the present and a 
future period is , while the one period discount factor between two future periods is . By 
including present-biased preferences into a standard intertemporal utility function, we get the 
following total utility function: 
 (A3.2) 
Assume a time-separable CRRA utility function29, in which the utility depends on the 
monetary payoff. In addition, there are only two time periods or dates that an agent has to 
allocate a given budget to (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Andreoni et al., 2015; Lührmann et 
al., 2014). The utility function has the following form: 
 (A3.3) 
where  is the amount allocated to the sooner date, while  is the amount allocated to the 
later date. The parameter 𝛼 captures the curvature of the utility function. 
Agents are assumed to maximize their total utility over time subject to the budget 
constraint, 
 (A3.4) 
where  is the gross interest rate,  is the budget. 
Maximizing (3) subject to (4) gives the following conditions: 
 
(A3.5) 
where  is an indicator for whether  Rewriting the equation by substituting 𝑥%'( = 𝑌 −𝑃𝑥% (from equation (4)) gives: 
                                                   
29 The CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function:  
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 (A3.6) 
This Equation (6) tells us that the higher present bias parameter 𝛽 and/or the higher 
discount factor 𝛿 leads to the higher fraction of the budget which is allocated to the sooner 
date 𝑥%. 
For parameter estimation, take log to equation (5): 
 (A3.7) 
 
We extend the model described in Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) to capture the 
situation when decisions also affect others. 
Assume that there is an agent 𝑖 who is delegated to decide for the whole group. Agent 𝑖’s decision is binding for all the other group members and 𝑖 cares about the utility of the 
other group members (𝑥O). The other group members could have the same, more patient or 
less patient time preferences than 𝑖. 
Agent 𝑖 has parameters 𝛿., 𝛽. and 𝛼.. The group member with the same time preference 
as 𝑖 has parameters 𝛿[(= 𝛿.), 𝛽[(= 𝛽.) and 𝛼[(= 𝛼.). The group member who is more patient 
than 𝑖  has parameters 𝛿\ , 𝛽\  and 𝛼\ . The group member who is less patient than 𝑖  has 
parameters 𝛿], 𝛽] and 𝛼]. Agent 𝑖 can observe the decisions made by the others before making 
decisions for the group. 
Agent 𝑖 includes the utilities of the others into the calculation with weights for each 
type of others as follows: 𝜔. for 𝑖’s own utility, 𝜔[ for the utility of a member with the same 
time preference, 𝜔\ for the utility of a member who is more patient than 𝑖, and 𝜔] for the 
utility of a member who is less patient than 𝑖. Hence, agent 𝑖 makes decisions based on a 
weighted utility function. 
There are four main possible cases regarding agent 𝑖’s time preferences compared to 
others’ preferences. 
Case 1: Agent 𝑖 does not care about the utility of the others according to the standard theory. 
The weights for the others are zero. Agent 𝑖 decides indifferently for a group than for oneself. 
Case 2: All types exist in the group, which means that 𝑖’s time preference lies between the 
most and the least patient members. 
The total utility of 𝑖 is 
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𝑈. = 𝜔. 𝑥.,%_ + 𝛽.%`𝛿.(𝑥.,%'(_ + 𝜔[ 𝑥.,%_ + 𝛽.%`𝛿.(𝑥.,%'(_a[=b[c.,[c\,[c]  +	 𝜔\ 𝑥\,%_ + 𝛽\%`𝛿\(𝑥\,%'(_d\=b\c.,\c[,\c]  
+ 𝜔] 𝑥],%_ + 𝛽]%`𝛿](𝑥],%'(_e]=b]c.,]c[,]c\  
(A3.8) 
with 𝛽\%`𝛿\( > 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( and 𝛽]%`𝛿]( < 	𝛽.%`𝛿.(. 
In our setting, 𝑖’s decision is binding for all group members (𝑥O), so the payoffs are the 
same for all the members: 
 𝑥%O = 𝑥.,% = 𝑥[,% = 𝑥\,% = 𝑥],% and 𝑥%'(O = 𝑥.,%'( = 𝑥[,%'( = 𝑥\,%'( = 𝑥],%'(. 
To simplify the model, assume that agent 𝑖 includes each type of other members with a 
representative. The weighted discounted utility is as follows: 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔[ ⋅ 𝑢[ + 𝜔\ ⋅ 𝑢\ + 𝜔] ⋅ 𝑢], (A3.9) 
where 𝜔 = 1	and 𝜔. = 𝜔[. 
Maximizing the weighted utility (9) in the case that all types exist, subject to the budget 
constraint: 𝑃𝑥%O + 𝑥%'(O = 𝑌, gives the following condition. 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	((𝜔. + 𝜔[)𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]() ijki (A3.10) 
Agent 𝑖 decides more patiently for a group than for oneself: g6h5678h 	< 	 565678,  𝑃 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]( ijki < 𝑃𝛽.%`𝛿.( ijki, 0 < 𝛼 < 1 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]( > 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]( > 1 − 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 
Assume that 𝛽\%`𝛿\( = 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝐶 and 𝛽]%`𝛿]( = 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( − 𝐶; 𝐶 is a constant. 𝜔\ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝐶 + 𝜔] 𝛽.%`𝛿.( − 𝐶 > 1 − 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\C + 𝜔]𝛽.%`𝛿.( − 𝜔]𝐶 > 1 − 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\ + 𝜔] 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\ − 𝜔] 𝐶 > 𝜔\ + 𝜔] 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\ − 𝜔] 𝐶 > 0 𝜔\ > 𝜔] 
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Agent 𝑖 decides more patiently for a group than for oneself, when 𝑖 weighs the more 
patient type more heavily than the less patient type, 𝜔\ > 𝜔]. And the opposite is true. 
Agent 𝑖	decides therefore more (less) patiently for groups when 𝑖  weighs the more 
patient type more (less) heavily than the less patient type. 
Case 3: Agent 𝑖 is the most patient member. 
 Case 3.1: Without any same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔] ⋅ 𝑢]	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	(𝜔.𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]() ijki 
 Case 3.2: With a same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔[ ⋅ 𝑢[ 	+ 𝜔] ⋅ 𝑢]	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	((𝜔. + 𝜔[)𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]() ijki 
Agent 𝑖 decides less patiently for a group than for oneself when 𝑖 is the most patient 
member in the group when 𝜔] > 0. 
Case 4: Agent 𝑖 is the least patient member 
 Case 4.1: Without any same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔\ ⋅ 𝑢\	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	(𝜔.𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽\%`𝛿\() ijki 
 Case 4.2: With a same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔[ ⋅ 𝑢[ 	+ 𝜔\ ⋅ 𝑢\	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	((𝜔. + 𝜔[)𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽\%`𝛿\() ijki 
Agent 𝑖 decides more patiently for a group than for oneself when 𝑖 is the least patient 
member in the group when 𝜔\ > 0. 
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3.8 Appendix B: Design for time-preference elicitation 
 
Table 3-5: Design for time-preference elicitation 
 (sooner 
date) 
 (delay) 
days 
 (gross 
interest rate) 
Standardized 
daily rate (%) 
Annual rate (%) 
0 14 1.05 0.37 217.57 
0 14 1.11 0.76 714.41 
0 14 1.25 2.58 3598.47 
0 14 1.43 3.71 12564.12 
0 14 2 5.08 100479.55 
     
0 28 1.05 0.18 85.67 
0 28 1.11 0.38 226.29 
0 28 1.25 0.80 795.98 
0 28 1.43 1.28 2116.61 
0 28 2 2.51 11574.99 
     
14 14 1.05 0.37 217.57 
14 14 1.11 0.76 714.41 
14 14 1.25 2.58 3598.47 
14 14 1.43 3.71 12564.12 
14 14 2 5.08 100479.55 
 
Note: The effective annual interest rate is quarterly compounded. 
 
  
€ 
t
€ 
k
€ 
P
3. The Persuasive Power of Patience in Groups 
 51 
Table 3-6: Complete decisions 
No. Payment dates Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
𝑡  
(sooner 
date) 
𝑘  
(delay 
days) 
𝑃  
(gross 
interest rate) 
1 
TODAY 285 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
2 
TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
3 
TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
4 
TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
5 
TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
         
6 
TODAY 285 Baht 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.05 
7 
TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.11 
8 
TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.25 
9 
TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.43 
10 
TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 2 
         
11 
in 2 WEEKS 285 Baht 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
12 
in 2 WEEKS 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
13 
in 2 WEEKS 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
14 
in 2 WEEKS 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
15 
in 2 WEEKS 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
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3.9 Appendix C: Implementation of payments 
The issues that may make participants of any intertemporal choice experiment reluctant 
to choose payoff in the future are (1) the trust of participants that payments will be made in 
the future and (2) the unequal transaction costs across payment dates. We try to address these 
concerns by implementing the procedure discussed in this section. Furthermore note that 
these concern would not confound our results in any case as our research interest is to 
compare the individual and the group setting, across which all conditions related to payments 
are held constant. 
Stay in the field: We were introduced to the community leaders by the NGO officers 
who had been working in the area for over 10 years. Then, the researcher who conducted the 
experiment, a native of Thailand, stayed in the village for around two months before the 
experiment started. During this period, the researcher conducted interviews both with 
individuals and with focus groups such that she was not a stranger anymore once the 
experiment started. To avoid any reciprocity concerns from the participants toward the 
researcher, participants were truthfully told them that the payoff from the experiment was not 
taken from the researcher’s personal money but instead came from a foreign granting 
organization. 
Announcement: The community leaders, who are also the committee members of the 
savings group, announced the experiment. They are trustworthy with regard to money issues, 
and assured participants that the researcher will pay as promised. 
Contract: Participants received a contract signed by the researcher, stating how much 
and on what dates they will get their payments. The researcher stressed to them that they 
could sue her if she does not pay them according to the contract. 
Transaction costs: The show-up fee of THB 100 was divided equally and paid in cash 
on both payment dates to compensate for transaction costs equally across both dates.  
Delivery of payments: Participants received the “today” payment in cash after the 
experiment. For the “later” payments, participants were asked to pick up the payoff at the 
community shop by the pier, a location everyone knows and passes by every day. The 
travelling expenses and time to the experiment locations and to the community shop should 
be roughly equal for participants. 
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3.10  Appendix D: Parameter estimates of the utility functions 
The decisions made in the experiment are used to estimate the utility parameters, 
namely the utility function curvature, α, discounting, δ, and present bias, β. First, we use the 
ordinary least squares regression based on Equation (A7) as a linear model. However, there is 
a problem at the corner solutions that the allocation ratio ln 565678  is not well defined. To 
address this issue, the non-linear least squares regression, based on Equation (A6) as a 
demand function, is used to estimate the utility parameters. 
Nevertheless, for the estimation, those participants who did not alter their choices at all 
(i.e., always choosing the same options across 15 decisions) are dropped out, since no 
variation in choices make it insufficient for the estimation. For decisions in the first round, 55 
participants showed no variation in their choices. For decisions in the second round, 
additional 25 participants are dropped. 
Estimates of parameters for choices in the individual setting 
Aggregate estimates 
The aggregate estimates of parameters from decisions for oneself (in the individual 
setting) by the NLS regression are more evidence for present bias on the aggregate level. The 
aggregate estimate of β is 0.86, which is smaller than 1.00, and the difference is statistically 
significant (Wald test, p < 0.001). On the other hand, the aggregate estimate of δ is 1.00 and 
is not significantly different from 1 (Wald test, p = 0.11). This suggests again that the longer 
time span in this experiment does not have an effect on decisions for oneself. 
The aggregate estimate of α, which captures the curvature of the utility function, is 0.66 
and significantly differs from 1 (Wald test, p < 0.001). This indicates that the utility function 
is not linear, but concave. 
Individual estimates 
Figure 3-4 shows the distribution of the estimates for β from the choices for oneself by 
the NLS regression. While the peak is at 1, we can see that substantial numbers of 
participants have β estimates smaller than 1, which indicates present-biased preferences. 
Also, there are smaller numbers of participants whose β estimates are bigger than 1, 
indicating future-biased preferences. The individual estimates for β differ significantly from 1 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.072). 
Figure 3-5 shows the distribution of estimates for individual δ. The values concentrate 
well on 1, and they are not significantly different from 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 
0.801). This suggests that on average the estimate for individual δ is 1, which means that if 
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earlier payment is not immediate, subjects value the later payment the same as the earlier 
payment. The time span has no effect on decisions for oneself. 
 
Figure 3-4: Estimates for β from choices for 
oneself 
Note: Nine subjects are dropped out in this figure, since they 
have very high Beta. 
 
Figure 3-5: Estimates for δ from choices for 
oneself 
Note: Seven subjects are dropped out in this figure. Six 
subjects have very high Delta and a subject has a highly 
negative Delta. 
Estimates of parameters for choices in the group setting 
Since participants are informed about the options that their group members chose for 
themselves, the estimates for the parameters used thereafter are at the group level in order to 
retain the independency of observations. 
Aggregate estimates 
Table 3-7 shows that on aggregate, α is significantly smaller than 1, which means the 
utility function is non-linear but concave. The estimate for β for oneself is smaller than 1, 
which means that present bias exists when participants decide for themselves, significantly in 
the main treatment. The estimate for β for a group is larger than β for oneself, suggesting that 
present bias decreases. Participants are less present-biased on average. But also, in the control 
treatment the estimated β in the second round increases. However, this increase leads to 
future bias, which is another type of inconsistency. Aggregate estimates for δ are around 1 in 
both rounds in both treatments. 
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Table 3-7: Aggregate utility parameter estimates by NLS regressions 
  Main Control 
  Oneself 
(1) 
Group 
(2) 
Oneself 
(3) 
Oneself 
(4) 
β 0.849 
(0.032) 
0.968 
(0.028) 
0.9719 
(0.0772) 
1.0490 
(0.0681) 
δ 1.002 
(0.002) 
0.996 
(0.002) 
1.0125 
(0.0043) 
0.9962 
(0.0034) 
α 0.661 
(0.027) 
0.70 
(0.025) 
0.6270 
(0.0888) 
0.8033 
(0.0520) 
     No. of 
subjects/groups 
113 48 12 11 
Observations 1695 1335 180 165 
R-squared 0.6 0.6173 0.5605 0.6412 
     
H0: β = 1 t = 22.65 
p < 0.001 
t = 1.33 
p = 0.254 
t = 0.13 
p = 0.7231 
t = 0.30 
p = 0.6106 
H0: δ = 1 t = 1.28 
p = 0.261 
t = 3.16 
p = 0.082 
t = 8.29 
p = 0.0150 
t = 0.67 
p = 0.4586 
H0: α = 1 t = 154.24 
p < 0.001 
t = 140.75 
p < 0.001 
t = 17.66 
p = 0.0015 
t = 14.91 
p = 0.0181 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. 
Individual estimates 
Figure 3-6 shows the distributions of the estimates for β for oneself and for a group in 
the main treatment. The distribution of β estimates from decisions for a group seems to 
converge to 1. However, β estimates from decisions for oneself and a group are not 
significantly different (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.625). 
 
Figure 3-6: Estimate for β from choices for groups in the main treatment 
Furthermore, the estimates for δ for oneself and for a group are not significantly 
different in the main treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = -0.113, p = 0.91).  
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3.11  Appendix E: The effect of others’ choices and communication on 
choice shifts 
Table 3-8: OLS regressions of changes in choices on others' decisions and communication (I) 
Dependent variable   Changes in choices 
Model   (1) (2) 
All 'more patient' others (dummy)  0.30** 
(0.15) 
0.30** 
(0.14) 
All 'less patient' others (dummy)  0.01 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
One 'more patient' and one 'less patient' others (dummy)  0.19 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(0.14) 
One 'more patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy)  0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
One 'less patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy)  0.09 
(0.13) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
Message Treatment (dummy)  0.10 
(0.20) 
0.11 
(0.23) 
M1: patient (dummy)  0.02 
(0.18) 
0.10 
(0.19) 
M2: neutral (dummy)  -0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
M3: impatient (dummy)  0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
M4: income smoothing (dummy)  -0.10 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
Option 3 chosen (dummy)  -0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.38*** 
(0.08) 
Interest rate  0.14 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
Age   -0.002 
(0.005) 
Female   0.10 
(0.11) 
Years in school   -0.003 
(0.02) 
Membership of savings groups (dummy)   -0.04 
(0.11) 
Constant  0.60* 
(0.31) 
0.78 
(0.50) 
No. of groups  52 52 
No. of observations  955 955 
R2   0.0822 0.0875 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered on group 
level in parentheses. 
Table 3-8 shows that the overall treatment effect as well as effect of each type of 
received message is small and insignificant. The effect of more patient others is still 
significant. Also, when one other is more patient while the other is equally patient, choices 
are shifted (weakly) significantly toward more patient direction. This points also toward an 
asymmetric conformity in favor of patience as in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-9: OLS regressions of changes in choices on others' decisions and communication (II) 
Dependent variable   Changes in choices 
Model   (I) (II) 
All 'more patient' others (dummy)  0.32** 
(0.14) 
0.32** 
(0.14) 
All 'less patient' others (dummy)  0.09 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
One 'more patient' and one 'less patient' others (dummy)  0.21 
(0.13) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
One 'more patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy)  0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
One 'less patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy)  0.12 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
Message Treatment (dummy)  0.04 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
All 'more patient' messages (dummy)  0.03 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.15) 
All 'less patient' messages (dummy)  -0.58 
(0.35) 
-0.51 
(0.35) 
One 'more patient' and one 'less patient' messages (dummy)  0.25 
(0.30) 
0.30 
(0.30) 
One 'more patient' and one 'equally patient' messages (dummy)  -0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
One 'less patient' and one 'equally patient' messages (dummy)  -0.003 
(0.22) 
0.08 
(0.25) 
One 'more patient' and one 'neutral' messages (dummy)  0.02 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
One 'less patient' and one 'neutral' messages (dummy)  0.05 
(0.32) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
Option 3 chosen (dummy)  -0.38*** 
(0.09) 
-0.39*** 
(0.09) 
Interest rate  0.16* 
(0.09) 
0.16* 
(0.09) 
Age   -0.001 
(0.005) 
Female   0.11 
(0.11) 
Years in school   -0.002 
(0.02) 
Membership of savings groups (dummy)   -0.04 
(0.11) 
Constant  0.64** 
(0.24) 
0.82* 
(0.47) 
No. of groups  52 52 
No. of observations  955 955 
R2   0.0869 0.0917 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered on group level 
in parentheses. The base category for message combination is the ‘neutral and equal patient’. 
Table 3-9 also shows small and insignificant effect of messages overall as well as for 
each combination of received messages. Again in this regression, ‘all patient others’ and one 
more patient and one equally patient others are significantly correlated to changes in choices, 
suggesting the asymmetric conformation toward a more patient choice shift. 
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3.12  Appendix F: Descriptive statistics of direction of choice shifts 
corresponding to others’ types 
 
Table 3-10: Effects of types of others on choice shifts for options 2 and 3 in the individual setting 
           Direction of choice 
shift 
Type of others 
More patient Same Less patient Total 
(1) More patient other(s) 149 (33.71%) 
242 
(54.75%) 
51 
(11.54%) 
442 
(100%) 
(2) Less patient other(s) 37 (17.45%) 
137 
(64.62%) 
38 
(17.92%) 
212 
(100%) 
(3) One more and one less 
patient 
78 
(35.94%) 
93 
(42.86%) 
46 
(21.20%) 
217 
(100%) 
(4) Equally patient others 8 (9.52%) 
68 
(80.95%) 
8 
(9.52%) 
84 
(100%) 
Total 272 540 143 955 
Table 3-10 shows the number of choice shifts in different directions when participants 
are informed about others’ choices in the following four cases: (1) More patient other(s): 
Both of the other members are more patient, or one other is more patient and the other is 
equally patient; (2) One more and one less patient: One other member is more patient and the 
other is less patient; (3) Less patient other(s): Both of the other members are less patient, or 
one other is less patient and the other is equally patient; (4) Equally patient others: Both other 
members are equally patient. 
In the case of the ‘more patient other(s)’, a lot more decisions are shifted to the more 
patient direction than to the less patient direction (i.e., 33.71% vs. 11.54%). In the case of the 
‘less patient other(s)’, the number of the ‘less patient’ and the ‘more patient’ shifts are quite 
similar (i.e., 17.92% vs. 17.45%). In the case of ‘one more and one less other’, ‘more patient’ 
shifts are more than the ‘less patient’ shifts as well (i.e., 35.94% vs. 21.20%).  
When all members are equally patient, participants do not seem to change their choices 
in any direction. This result emphasizes the importance of information about others’ time 
preferences. It suggests that people do not try to maximize only the total monetary payoff as 
Shapiro (2010) models, which would lead to a more patient shift in this ‘equally patient 
others’ case, but they take into account the preferences of other members. 
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Table 3-11: Effects of others on choice shifts for the least patient option (option 1) in the individual 
setting 
         Direction of choice 
shift 
Type of others 
More patient Same Total 
(1) More patient other(s) 152 (37.72%) 
251 
(62.28%) 
403 
(100%) 
(2) Equally patient others 8 (11.59%) 
61 
(88.41%) 
69 
(100%) 
Total 160 312 472 
 
Table 3-12: Effects of others on choice shifts for the most patient option (option 4) in the individual 
setting 
          Direction of choice 
shift 
Type of others 
Less patient Same Total 
(1) Less patient other(s) 139 (19.25%) 
633 
(81.99%) 
772 
(100%) 
(2) Equally patient others 26 (9.42%) 
250 
(90.58%) 
276 
(100%) 
Total 165 833 1048 
 
Table 3-11 and Table 3-12 show the number of choice shifts when participants choose 
the least patient option and the most patient option in the individual setting, respectively. The 
first case in Table 3-11 is that when at least one other member is more patient than the 
participants. The second case is that when all members are equally patient. We can see that 
the percentage of the ‘more patient’ choice shift in the first case is much larger than in the 
second case, 37.72% vs. 11.59%. In Table 3-12 the percentage of the ‘less patient’ choice 
shift in the first case is larger than in the second case, 19.25% vs. 9.42%. Comparing the 
percentage of the first case in Table 3-11 and Table 3-12, however, show that choice shift in 
the direction of others’ preferences occurs more when others are more patient. 
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3.13  Appendix G: Instructions 
Note: 
1. The instructions are read and explained out loud and are not given as written 
instructions. 
2. The titles in bold are not read out loud, but for the understanding of the instructors. 
3. The italic and underlined letters are what the instructors do or demonstrate. 
 
Welcome everyone. Thank you very much for your participation. We are from Mahidol 
University and the University of Cologne, Germany, to study human decisions. We are 
financially supported by EEPSEA (Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia), 
which is a research organization for environmental economics.  
Today’s activity will take approximately 2 hours of your time. The first part is the 
game. When we are done with the game, we would like you to stay for an interview by our 
facilitators from Walailak University30. 
In this game, we use real money. The amount you will earn depends on your decisions 
and also on others’ decisions. 
The decisions 
In this game, we have various amounts of money for you to allocate to two days. You 
have to choose one option that you like the most. You will make several decisions on how 
you allocate money between today and a day in the future or between two days in the future, 
for example, in two weeks or in four weeks from now. 
You will make several decisions, but we will randomly pick one decision to be the 
actual payment by drawing lots. Thus, each decision can be the one that determines your 
actual payoffs! So it is in your interest to take every decision seriously. 
The calendars 
In each decision, there are 4 options (point at the calendars). Each calendar represents 
each option and shows the amount of money on the two payment days. Your assignment is to 
choose one option that will pay you your most favorite way. The facilitators will be there to 
answer your questions anytime. 
Example 
Let’s look at the example. 
                                                   
30 Walailak University is the university located in the same sub-district, Thasala, as our study site. 
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Insert the payment days on the top of the calendars (e.g. today and in 2 weeks). In this 
example, you will get the money today after the activity (point at the date in the calendar) 
and in 3 weeks (point at the date in the calendar). In every option, you will get different 
amounts of money (insert the cards with the corresponding amounts at the corresponding 
dates). 
Explanation of the example 
If you choose the first option, you choose to get THB 285 today and nothing in 3 
weeks. If you choose the second option, you choose to get THB 190 today and THB 100 in 3 
weeks. If you choose the third option, you choose to get THB 95 today and THB 200 in 3 
weeks. If you choose the fourth option, you choose to get nothing today and THB 300 in 3 
weeks. 
Notice that the amount of money you will get today decreases from option to option 
from THB 285 to 0 (point at these amounts from calendar to calendar). On the other hand, 
the amount of money you will get in the future, i.e., in 3 weeks, increases from option to 
option from 0 to THB 300 (point at these amounts from calendar to calendar). The total 
amounts of money on both payment days in each option are different, i.e., the total amount 
increases but you have to wait longer (explain the total amount in each calendar). Thus, you 
have to trade-off between the money you will get today and in the future. Choose your 
favorite option. There is no right or wrong answer. It is just about your preference. 
Test questions 
Do you understand the instructions so far? If not so, please feel free to ask questions. 
Then please answer the following questions. 
If I choose option 1, how much would I get today? (The answer is THB 285). And how 
much would I get in 3 weeks (The answer is nothing). 
If my favorite option were to get THB 190 today and THB 100 in 3 weeks, which 
option would I have to choose? (The answer is option 2) 
 
Practice round 
In the game, you will have to answer an answer sheet like this one (distribute the 
answer sheet for the practice round). There are 4 options shown in the answer sheet similar 
to those shown at the front of the room. You have to circle the number in front of your 
favorite option. If you like the first option, then circle number 1, and so on. Like in the 
example, I would have to circle the number 2. 
Do you have any questions? 
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Let’s choose. Circle the option that you prefer in the test answer sheet. We do not pay 
for this decision. The facilitators will collect the answer sheets and bring them to the 
researchers to insert the information. 
The number of decisions 
There are two rounds in this game (show the chart to demonstrate the number of 
decisions). In each round, we would like you to make 15 decisions. There are three different 
time frames. The first time frame is that you will get a payoff today and in two weeks. We 
play this time frame in the first to the fifth decisions. The second time frame is that you will 
get the payoff today and in four weeks. We play this time frame in the sixth to the tenth 
decisions. The third time frame is that you will get the payoff in two weeks and in four 
weeks. We play his time frame in the eleventh to the fifteenth decisions. 
There are two rounds of these decisions. We will explain the rules before you play each 
round. Thus, you have to make 30 decisions in total. Don’t worry if you cannot remember all 
these numbers, because before you make every decision, we will indicate the payment days 
and show the options to you. Your job is just to choose 1 favorite option out of 4 given 
options. 
How will we pay you? 
We will pay one out of the total 30 decisions. We have made 30 lots. Each lot, with a 
number from 1 to 30, represents each decision (show the box with 30 lots). At the end of the 
game, we will draw a lot. Assume that we draw the fifteenth decision; you will get the money 
in two weeks and in four weeks. 
On both payment days, you will get additional THB 50 to thank you for your 
participation and for your travel. For example, if you choose option 1, today you would get 
THB 285 and an additional THB 50, so THB 335 in total, and in three weeks you would get 0 
and an additional THB 50, so THB 50 in total. If you choose option 4, today you would get 0 
and an additional THB 50, so THB 50 in total, and in three weeks you would get THB 300 
and an additional THB 50, so THB 350 in total. 
The payoff for today, you will get immediately after this activity. For the payoff in the 
future, please pick it up at the community shop of the NTFCG by the pier. Does everyone 
know it? 
Caution 
During the game, please make sure that the other participants do not know your 
choices. Do not show your answer sheets to others and you are not allowed to talk to each 
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other. If you break these rules, we have to ask you to leave the activity and you will not get 
any payment. 
The consent form 
It seems that everyone would like to start playing the game, doesn’t it? 
Before we start, please sign this consent form (distribute the consent forms). In the 
consent form, it is stated that … 
You participate in this activity with your own free will. 
Your decisions are kept secret in the future and the other participants will not know 
your decisions. 
In the data analysis, we will not link your decisions with your identity but only with 
your ID number in this activity. 
 
Summary of the game 
Any questions? 
Every decision can be the one that determines your payoff, which depends on your 
choice. Thus, you have to take every decision seriously. Please keep in mind that you can ask 
questions any time and you’re not allowed to talk to the other participants. 
Let’s start the game. 
 
Round 1: individual 
In the first round or the following 15 decisions, only your choice determines your 
payoff. 
(Distribute the answer sheet of the first decision.) This is the answer sheet of the first 
decision. Please circle your favorite option. Do not forget to write down your ID number at 
the top right of the answer sheet. At the end of the game, if we draw a decision in this round 
to pay you, you will receive the payoff according to the option you have chosen. 
In the first decision, you have to choose the payment option that you would like to get 
TODAY and IN 2 WEEKS from now (Stick the cards written “TODAY” and “IN 2 WEEKS” 
on the top of the calendars in front of the room). If you choose option 1, you will get THB 
285 today (Insert the card written “285” in the today’s cell) and get nothing in 2 weeks from 
now (Insert the card written “0” in the cell of 2 weeks). Continue explaining options 2 to 4. 
You have to choose one favorite option. Let’s circle it on the answer sheet. 
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If you’re done with the first round, let’s continue with the second decision. (Assistants 
collect answer sheets. One assistant helps changing the cards with the amount of payoff and 
the instructor explains all the options.) 
(After the 15 decisions have been made). Now we are done with the 15 decisions, the 
first round is over. Next, let’s play the second round. The rule changes. 
Round 2: [Variations between the group and control treatments] 
Group decision [for the group treatment] 
In this round, you are assigned randomly into a group of three members. In each group, 
there are a “shrimp”, a “fish”, and a “crab” (show the chart “group”). We do the 
randomization for you and randomly assign who are the “shrimp”, the “fish”, and the “crab” 
of your group. At no point will you know who your group members are. Still, you are not 
allowed to talk to others. In this round, you still decide individually and the decisions and 
options are the same as in the first round. 
The difference from the first round or the last 15 decisions is that one group member, 
either the “shrimp”, “fish”, or “crab”, will be the representative of the group due to the 
random draw. Everyone in the group will receive the same payoff according to the 
representative’s choice. Every group member has an equal chance to be selected as the group 
representative because we will draw one of the three lots (with the animal symbols) from this 
box (show the bag and lots). Keep in mind that everyone has an equal chance to be selected 
the group representative and everyone will get the same payoff according to the 
representative’s choice. 
Do you have any questions? 
The facilitators come back to the room with answer sheets for the second round, which 
are already filled out with the decisions of other group members. 
This is the answer sheet for the next decision. Please circle your favorite option. 
However, now you will know the choices of your group members from the previous round. 
Look at the bottom of the answer sheet. You can see the choices that your other group 
members made in this decision in the previous round. Please note that we show only your 
choices from the last 15 decisions in the first round, and identify you by the symbol of 
aquatic animals. Thus, your real identities are still kept secret. 
At the end of the game, if we draw a decision in this round to pay you, the 
representative of the group will be randomly selected. All group members will receive the 
payoff according to the option that the representative has chosen. 
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Individual decision [for the control treatment] 
In this round, we have the same rule as that in the first round. You still decide 
individually, and the decisions and options are the same as those in the first round. However, 
you can make the same or different choices as you like. 
 
Let’s start the second round. 
Explain the same 15 decisions as in the first round. 
Now, we are done with the second round. So, the game is over. 
 
The random draw for the payment 
We are going to draw a lot now to see which decision will determine your payoff. Are 
you exited? Who is going to draw the lot? 
The lot is drawn. The experimenter shows the lot publicly. 
The decision … determines your actual payoff. (Show the decision again on the board.) 
Can you remember what you have chosen? 
[If it is the decision from the first round] The actual payoff is determined by the 
decision from the first round, so your choice will determine your payoff. 
[If it is the decision from the second round] The actual payoff is determined by the 
decision from the second round, so we have to draw another lot to randomly select the group 
representative. Who is going to draw this lot? The lot is drawn. The experimenter shows the 
lot publicly. The group representative is … (fish, crab, or shrimp). Her choice will determine 
the payoff of all group members. 
At this moment, the experimenters outside are preparing the payoffs and also the 
contract for the future payment for you. 
 
Post-experiment questionnaire 
While we are waiting for the contract and payment, let us start the second part of 
today’s activity, which is the questionnaire. 
For answering this questionnaire, you will get additional THB 100 today for sure. You 
will get the payoff today after you have finished the questionnaire. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Chapter 4:  
Speaking of patience: 
The role of others’ preferences and 
communication in groups 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Intertemporal decisions are common in everyday life. Most of our decisions today have 
consequences in the future, for example, the decisions to save money, to exercise or to study, 
etc. We often give in the temptation to choose the option that offers the smaller but sooner 
benefit rather than choosing the option that offers the larger but later benefit. For instance, we 
end up spending all monthly salary without saving any cents although we planned to save as 
we got paid. This phenomenon can be theoretically described by present-biased preferences 
in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997). The summary article by Frederik, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) finds that on average individual discount rates decline 
over time, which contradicts the assumption of constant discount rates in the discounted-
utility model (e.g. Samuelson, 1937). Frederik, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) show 
therefore that present-biased preferences indeed exist. Individuals, however, have different 
discount rates across a wide range suggesting heterogeneity of individual time preferences. 
In many situations a single person is responsible for making intertemporal decisions 
that affect a group of people. For example, a president of a company decides on investment 
strategy that is decisive for company’s long-term profit and in turn affects all stakeholders’ 
benefit. In many cultures and areas, a household head decides on a household’s financial plan 
that affects the livelihood of the whole family. It is crucial to ask whether making decisions 
on behalf of a group leads to different decisions than making decisions just for oneself. 
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Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017) (Chapter 3) ask this question and find in 
a Thai coastal village that decisions made for a group are more patient and less present-biased 
compared to decisions made for oneself. The explanation is that when villagers decide on 
behalf of a group, they conform more to a more patient member than to a less patient 
member. Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017) argue that patience could be 
considered as a socially desirable behavior. Yet, they find that communication among group 
members does not have an additional effect on decisions for a group. However, Sutter (2009) 
finds that participants invest more in a lottery to have a higher probability of winning the 
lottery when deciding for a group than deciding just for oneself and that communication via 
nonbinding messages makes participants invest even more in the lottery when deciding for a 
group. 
Based on Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017) this chapter also studies 
the difference between decisions for oneself and for a group. Then I investigate the effects of 
two features on intertemporal decisions for a group: time preferences of other members and 
communication between group members. One novel feature of Boonmanunt, Lauer, 
Rockenbach and Weiss (2017) is to have coastal villagers, who are familiar with deciding in 
groups or for groups as participants, in the experiment. This fact, however, could influence 
their findings on the difference between decisions for oneself and for a group. In this study I 
therefore use a more standard subject pool, university students, to investigate whether the 
findings in Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017) can be generalized to a 
broader population without much experiences of being in groups. The students might also 
feel more comfortable in communication via written messages than villagers. This might 
allow me to study the additional effect of communication on decisions for a group more 
deeply. 
In the experiment participants first decide just for themselves and then decide on behalf 
of a group with three members who are randomly matched. Prior to making decisions on 
behalf of the group, participants can observe other members’ preferences, i.e., the choices 
that the other group members made for themselves in the individual setting. In order to study 
the additional effect of communication between members on decisions for a group on top of 
influence of other members’ (reveal) preferences, I allow a subset of participants to 
communicate with each other using nonbinding free-form messages before the experiment in 
the group setting starts. 
I find that participants choose more patiently for a group than for themselves. This is 
driven by both other group members’ preferences as well as communication. Only when 
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other members are more patient than the decision maker, others’ preferences influence 
decisions for a group, while less patient preferences of others do not. This asymmetric 
conformity bias toward patience is along the same lines as in Boonmanunt, Lauer, 
Rockenbach and Weiss (2017). In contrast, however, communication plays a significant role 
on decisions for a group in this study. Patient messages are most persuasive. These findings 
suggest that there is an asymmetric conformity bias toward patience when decisions are made 
on behalf of a group. 
4.2 Related literature 
This study closely resembles the experimental design of Boonmanunt, Lauer, 
Rockenbach, and Weiss (2017) (Chapter 3) to disentangle mechanisms driving decisions for a 
group in an intertemporal context with different treatment variations. Another difference is 
also the subject pool: university students in this study compared to coastal villagers in 
Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach, and Weiss (2017). 
Previous studies show that group decisions are different from individual decisions. 
Starting from literature on social and group identity, the main insight is that people 
identifying with a group behave differently from individuals, i.e., more favorably to in-group 
members at the expenses of out-group people (e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Chen and Li, 
2009). Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007), however, show that even without an out-
group the salient group membership alone already affects individual behavior in coordination 
and prisoner’s dilemma games: Individuals become more aggressive when deciding on behalf 
of a group. While Sutter (2009) also finds individuals invest more in a lottery to increase the 
chance of winning when deciding on behalf on a group than when deciding for oneself. 
Furthermore, Sutter (2009) argues that one important feature of group decisions is the 
communication between group members. Sutter (2009) finds that individuals invest even 
more in a lottery when deciding on behalf of a group after receiving messages from other 
group members. 
There are two contradictory models with regard to comparison between decisions for 
oneself and for a group. Shapiro (2010) models a delegate as being altruistic over payoffs 
(and not utility) of other group members. Such delegate will make more patient and more 
time-consistent decisions when she decides on behalf of all members than when she decides 
only for herself. By contrast, Jackson and Yariv (2014) model a delegate who fully takes the 
time preferences of group members into account. Therefore, a delegate of a group with, for 
instance, present-biased preferences on average will also make present-biased decisions. 
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These two models show that the intertemporal decisions of a delegate depend on how much 
weight the delegate puts on other group members’ preferences. 
Previous experiments that only compare intertemporal decisions for oneself and for a 
group do not provide a clear picture. Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, and Parashiv (2013) invite 
couples in Paris to an experiment. Participants first make individual decisions separately and 
then they decide together. Yang and Carlsson (2016) conduct a similar experiment with 
spouses in rural China. Shapiro (2010) let each participant decide for oneself, for another 
subject. Then, both partners decide together, and lastly the participants jointly decide in a 
group of four members. Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, and Parashiv (2013) and Shapiro (2010) find 
that group decisions are more patient and less present-biased. Yang and Carlsson (2016), 
however, find that spouses’ joint decisions lie between husbands and wives’ decisions (made 
individually). 
The independent work of Denant-Boemont, Diecidue and L’Haridon (2016) is close to 
this study and Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017). In their study, each 
participant decides both individually and then in groups under majority voting. After four 
mock-voting rounds, the decisions in the fifth (and last) round determine the payoffs. Group 
decisions are calculated by the median of all members’ choices. Denant-Boemont, Diecidue 
and L’Haridon find that members converge their decisions toward higher patience and less 
present bias. This study differs in regard to the group decision mechanism. Most importantly, 
I explicitly study how time preferences of others and communication affect decisions on 
behalf of a group in a standard subject pool: university students. 
4.3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
I adopt the theoretical framework of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), which incorporates 
present-biased preferences into a standard intertemporal utility function. The total utility of a 
stream of consumption from a present period t to period T into the future thereby becomes 
𝑈% = 𝑢 𝑐% + 𝛽 𝛿(𝑢(𝑐%'()<(=>  (1) 
where 𝑘 is the time span; 𝛿 captures long-run discounting (a discount factor) between two 
future periods; and 𝛽 is a parameter for present-biased preference with 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 1 . 𝛽 = 1 
corresponds to the case of standard exponential discounting such that the one period discount 
factor between a present and a future period 𝛽𝛿 and the one period discount factor between 
two future periods 𝛿  are equal. By maximizing this utility function subject to a budget 
constraint Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) show that the higher the present-biased parameter 𝛽 
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is and/or the higher the long-run discounting 𝛿 is, the higher is the fraction of the budget 
allocated to the sooner date 𝑥%. 
I then extend this model to capture the situation when a delegate’s decision affects 
other people. Assume that an agent is delegated to decide for the whole group. The agent’s 
decision is binding for all other members and the agent cares about the utility of the other 
members, who could have the same, more or less patient time preference than the agent. The 
agent therefore takes the utility of others into account with weights for each type of 
preferences in the agent’s utility function. The weights for the other types could be the same 
or different across types. The agent then maximizes the weighted discounted utility. As a 
result, the agent might make different decisions when deciding for the group, depending on 
how the agent weighs each type of preferences.1 
Behavioral expectations 
In case that the weights are zero because the delegate cares only about her own utility, 
thus the null hypothesis is that decisions for oneself and for a group are not different. 
In case that the delegate has the same weights greater than zero for all types of others, 
then she will behave like a (neutral) conformist. This identical weight yields the symmetric 
conformity hypothesis. It states that subjects react in the same way toward the decisions of a 
more patient and a less patient player when deciding for a group. Symmetric conformity, 
however, does not change the average decision in the group setting compared to the 
individual setting. This is because to the same extent that patient delegates become less 
patient and impatient delegates become more patient. In case that the delegate puts different 
weights to different type of preferences when deciding for a group, the average decision in 
the group setting will differ from the one in the individual setting. I call this the asymmetric 
conformity hypothesis. 
Communication could decrease social distances between the delegate and other 
members. This could in turn lead to higher weights on others’ utilities (Hoffman, McCabe 
and Smith, 1996) and stronger conformity toward others’ preferences when decisions are 
made for a group. This yields the communication hypothesis. 
4.4 The experimental design 
The experimental design in this study is based on the experimental design used in 
Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach, and Weiss (2017)(Chapter 3). To elicit subjects’ time 
preferences, subjects have to make a battery of decisions. For this, the convex time budget 
                                                   
1 See detailed formal calculation and the model in Appendix A. 
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method is implemented based on Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), Andreoni, Kuhn and 
Sprenger (2015), and Lührmann, Serra-Garcia and Winter (2014). I use three time frames: (I) 
today and 2 weeks, (II) today and 4 weeks, and (III) 2 weeks and 4 weeks. The degree of 
present-biasedness (𝛽) can be identified by comparing choices made in (I) and (III), as both 
time frames have the same time span of two weeks, but the sooner date in (I) is immediate 
while it is in 2 weeks in (III). The long-run2 discounting parameter (𝛿) can be identified by 
choices made in time frame (III) since both payment days are in the future. 
The maximum experimental budget (𝑀) is always THB 300 (about USD 9),3 which is 
the minimum daily wage in Thailand. I use five interest rates for each time frame, from 5% to 
100% for two weeks.4 These are much larger than the market interest rate at commercial 
banks.5 
 Decisions 
Table 4-1: Decisions in time frame I (today,+2weeks)6 
No. Payment dates Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
𝑡  
(sooner 
date) 
𝑘  
(delay 
days) 
𝑃  
(gross 
interest rate) 
1 TODAY 285 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
2 TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
3 TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
4 TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
5 TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
Note: The last three columns are not shown to participants. 
Table 4-1 summarizes all five decisions (rows in the table) for time frame I 
(today,+2weeks). The corresponding parameters are shown in the last three columns. The 
options stay the same in time frame II (today,+4weeks) and time frame III 
(+2weeks,+4weeks). For each decision, subjects have to choose one favorite budget 
allocation out of four options. Option 4 offers the highest total payoff of THB 300, but 
subjects have to wait to get money at the later date. Option 1 offers the whole budget on the 
sooner date but discounted by the corresponding interest rate. The sum payoffs over both 
dates increases with the option number. Option 4 is therefore the most patient option, while 
                                                   
2 Following Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015), we denote delta as long-run discounting parameter. 
3 USD 1 was equal to THB 32.62 when the experiment was conducted. 
4 See more details about the standardized daily rate and the annual rate of decisions in Appendix B. 
5 The average annual deposit interest rate in Thailand in 2014 is around 2.00% (The World Bank, 2016). 
6 See complete 15 decisions for all three time frames in Appendix B. 
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option 1 is the least patient option. All subjects have to go through all 15 decisions, i.e., five 
decisions for each time frame, which are presented one at a time. 
 Treatments 
Subjects are informed at the beginning of the experiment that there are two decision 
settings and that the rules of the second setting will be explained after all subjects have 
finished the first setting. The within-subject design is employed in order to see whether 
subjects change choices when deciding for a group instead of deciding just for themselves. 
There are three treatments as follows. 
Group treatment (N = 57) 
For the Group treatment, subjects decide individually just for themselves in the first 
setting. In the second setting, subjects decide as a group member, whose decision could 
represent the group decision. They are randomly matched into groups of three members. To 
keep the identities of the group members anonymous, I use the symbols “Shrimp”, “Crab”, 
and “Fish”, to represent each member. Subjects make 15 decisions in each setting, which 
makes 30 decisions in total. Most importantly, in order to study how other members’ choices 
affect subjects’ choices for the group, subjects can observe the options that the other two 
group members made for themselves in the individual setting before subjects make a choice 
for their groups. For the payoffs, one randomly selected group member acts as a delegate 
(after all decisions are made), whose choice is binding for all three members. 
Message treatment (N = 48) 
In order to study a stronger form of group decision as discussed in Sutter (2009), 
communication between group members is added in this treatment. Communication is 
implemented by the opportunity to exchange nonbinding free-form messages among group 
members before the group setting starts. In each round of message exchange, each subject has 
to send one message to each group members, so each subject receives two separate messages 
from the two other members. Subjects can write on sheets of paper any kind of message, 
except revealing their identity, threaten or negotiate outside options. They are asked to write 
about decisions in the game, for instance suggestions for other members, their own choices in 
the individual setting or their intended choices in the group setting. All participants followed 
these instructions. 
There are two variations of this treatment: (a) 21 subjects exchange messages only once 
(M1) and (b) 27 subjects exchange messages for three rounds (M3). Three rounds of 
exchanging messages are intended to mimic more intense communication between group 
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members. I find, however, no difference between choices and time preferences between the 
M1 and M3, neither in choices made for oneself nor in choices made for a group (see test 
results in Appendix C). As such, to increase statistical power in the analysis of the effect of 
communication, both variations are pooled together into the “Message” treatment. 
In addition, participants can observe other group members’ choices in the individual 
setting before making every (of the 15) decision for groups, as in the Group treatment. In this 
way, I can disentangle the additional effect that messages have on choices for a group on top 
of other members’ preferences. Therefore, each participant is informed about other group 
members through two channels: other members’ choices made just for themselves in the 
individual setting (revealed preferences) and the messages. 
Control treatment (N = 27) 
In order to control for possible learning effects between the individual setting and the 
group setting, I run a control treatment, in which subjects decide just for themselves in the 
individual setting twice. 
 Payment 
One out of all 30 decisions is randomly drawn to determine the actual payment. In case 
a decision from the individual setting is drawn, participants receive the payment according to 
their own choices made for themselves. In case a decision from the group setting is drawn, a 
delegate (one out of the three symbols) is drawn randomly. The delegate’s choice for the 
group then determines the payments for all three members. With this mechanism, all 
decisions are payoff-relevant and income effects can be avoided. The show-up fee is THB 
100 (around USD 3). 
In order to keep participants’ trust level in receiving payments constant across payment 
dates, all payments are made via bank transfer, including payments that were supposed to be 
due on the experimental days. 
 Experimental procedure 
The experiment was conducted on 25-27 April 2015 at the Kasertsart University in 
Bangkok, Thailand. The participants were university students from different disciplines. In 
total, 132 students (68% female) participated across all treatments. The experiment took 
around 80 minutes in the Group treatment, 90 minutes in the Message treatment and 60 
minutes in the control treatment. The total average earning was THB 387.65 (about USD 12). 
4. Speaking of Patience 
 74 
 Measures of (revealed) time preferences 
The reduced-form measures of time preferences are used so that I can avoid making 
assumptions on the utility function that would be required if I estimated parameters in a 
structural-model framework (Sutter et al., 2013 use the non-parametric measures due to this 
argument).7 
The reduced-form measure of present-biasedness is calculated as the difference 
between the average of the five choices made for time frame III (+2weeks,+4weeks) and for 
time frame I (today,+2weeks). If a participant is non-biased, then she chooses the same 
option in both time frames, and the measure is zero.8 If a participant is present-biased, she 
chooses the higher options (more patient), and then the measure is positive. The opposite 
holds for a future-biased participant. 
Measure of present-biasedness = Average choice in time frame III – Average choice in time frame I 
 
 
The reduced-form measure of long-run discounting is calculated as the average of the 
five choices made in time frame III (+2weeks, +4weeks), in which both payment dates are in 
the future. Present-biasedness, therefore, does not play a role. 
Measure of long-run discounting = Average choice in time frame III (scale from 1 – 4) 
 
4.5 Results 
First, I check the rationality of choices according to the law of demand.9 I find that only 
2.27% of all participants made an extremely irrational shift, which is when participants 
change from the most patient option (option 4) to the least patient option (option 1) as the 
interest rates increase. There are, however, small and non-extreme shifts. Nevertheless, the 
share of rational choices is very high: 89.72% of all choices made for oneself and 93.38% of 
                                                   
7 I also estimate parameters 𝛽. and 𝛿.	of the utility function based upon Equations (A4.6) and (A4.7) in Appendix A. 
However, I cannot estimate individual parameters of those participants who did not alter the choice at all across 15 
decisions, since no variation in choices make it insufficient for the estimation. For decisions in the individual setting, our 
sample is reduced by 19 subjects (out of 132). For decisions in the group setting, the sample is additionally reduced by 15 
subjects. The main results of this method are not different from using the actual choices and reduced-form measures. 
Appendix D shows our results for this estimation. 
8 The problem with this measure of present-biasedness is that participants could be present-biased for some decisions 
and future-biased for others, leading to a bias of 0 on average. In our sample, there are some cases falling into this situation; 
9 out of 42 non-biased participants in the individual setting and 5 out of 57 non-biased participants in the group setting. 
Excluding these participants, results remain similar. We therefore include them in the analysis. 
9 Choices are rational when participants allocate less to the sooner date, which means opting for a higher option 
when the interest rate increases. 
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choices made for a group. All decisions are then included in the analysis, since the main 
results stay the same when irrational choices are excluded. 
 Choices for oneself versus for a group 
The first question to be answered in this study is whether participants decide differently 
when deciding for oneself and for a group. Table 4-2 summarizes the means of choices 
(chosen options) and measures of time preferences in individual and group settings in all 
treatments. 
Table 4-2: Means of choices (chosen options) and measures of time preferences in both settings in 
each time frame and treatment  
 
(1) Group (2) Message (3) Control 
For 
oneself 
For a 
group 
Diff- 
erence 
For 
oneself 
For a 
group 
Diff- 
erence 
For 
oneself 
For 
oneself 
Diff- 
erence 
Overall 3.20 3.35 0.15*** 3.41 3.56 0.15*** 3.13 3.21 0.08 
Time frame I 
(today,+2wks) 3.17 3.34 0.17** 3.43 3.61 0.18*** 3.2 3.33 0.13 
Time frame II 
(today,+4wks) 3.11 3.23 0.12** 3.25 3.45 0.20*** 2.98 3.07 0.09 
Time frame III 
(+2wks,+4wks) 3.32 3.49 0.17** 3.55 3.63 0.08** 3.21 3.26 0.05 
Measure of 
present-biasedness 0.15 0.15 0 0.12 0.02 -0.10* 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 
Measure of long-
run discounting 3.32 3.49 0.17** 3.55 3.63 0.08** 3.21 3.26 0.05 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Wilcoxon signed-rank test between options chosen in both settings, as well as 
measures of time preferences. 
 
Control treatment 
In the control treatment, in which the participants decide for oneself twice, I find no 
difference between choices as well as measures of time preferences across both rounds 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: p-values are 0.62, 0.40, 0.22, 0.44 for overall choices and 
choices in time frames I, II and III, respectively; p-values are 0.76 and 0.44 for measures of 
present-biasedness and long-run discounting, respectively). 
Result 1: Participants do not “learn” over time when deciding just for oneself. Rather they 
tend to stick to their choices. 
Group treatment 
In the Group treatment, group members in the group setting can observe preferences of 
other group members (choices made in the individual setting). Participants in this treatment 
choose on average significantly more patient options when deciding for a group than when 
deciding just for oneself overall and in all time frames (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-values 
are 0.009 for choices overall and 0.03 in each time frames). While the measure of long-run 
4. Speaking of Patience 
 76 
discounting is significantly higher, which corresponds to the changes in choices in time frame 
III, the measure of present-biasedness, however, has not changed (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
p = 0.86). This is because choices change to a similar extent in time frame I (the short-run 
time frame) and in time frame III (the long-run time frame). See column “Difference” of 
Group treatment in Table 4-2. 
The results in control and Group treatments indicate that participants decide more 
patiently for a group than for oneself due to the group effect and not from experience gained 
during the experiment. 
Result 2: Participants choose more patient options when they decide for a group, whose 
members’ time preferences can be observed. However, their measures of present-biasedness 
remain unchanged. 
 Communication 
In the Message treatment, I add the opportunity to exchange messages to the Group 
treatment. The difference between decisions in the Group and Message treatments can reveal 
the additional effect of exchanging messages among members, which is a simple form of 
communication, on decisions made for a group. 
Before the experiment in the group setting starts, each participant receives separate 
messages from two other group members. Therefore, there are different combinations of 
messages that participants can get. The combinations of message types are categorized as 
follows: The most frequently received message type is ‘Patient messages’, which is when 
participants receive messages that try to convince them to be patient10 or the combination of 
patient and neutral 11  messages. The second most received message type is ‘Twisted 
messages’ that suggest receivers to choose a less patient option in decisions with lower 
interest rate and to choose a more patient option in decisions with higher interest rate.12 The 
next type is ‘Patient and twisted messages’ when receivers get patient and twisted messages. 
‘Patient and impatient messages’ is when receivers get a message suggesting patient decision 
and the other suggesting an impatient13 decision. Then, there are ‘Twisted and impatient 
                                                   
10 Example for a patient message: “Choose option 4 because it offers the highest total payoff although we have to 
wait to have it all.” 
11 Example for a neutral message: “Choose whatever choice you want.” 
12 Example for a twisted message: “If we get the payoff of 290 or 285 Baht today, which is not much different from 
300 Baht, then please choose option 1. But if we will get only 260 Baht today, please choose option 4. I can wait.” 
13 An impatient message: “Do not choose option 4. We have to wait for so long. I have to use money at this moment. 
Actually, choose want you want :).” 
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messages’ and lastly ‘neutral messages’. The numbers of participants who received each type 
of messages are listed in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3: Number of participants who receive each type of messages 
Types of messages No. of participants 
Patient messages 23 
Twisted messages 14 
Patient and twisted messages 8 
Patient and impatient messages 1 
Twisted and impatient messages 1 
Neutral messages 1 
 
Overall participants with the opportunity to exchange messages choose significantly 
more patient options for a group than for oneself and also in all three time frames (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p-values are 0.003, 0.007, 0.003 and 0.03 for choices overall and in time 
frames I, II and III, respectively). Consequently, the measure of long-run discounting 
increases significantly as the choices in the long-run time frame (time frame III). The 
reduction of the measure of present-biasedness is weakly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p = 0.07) as participants choose more patient options in time frame I, the short-run time 
frame, to the higher extent than in time frame 3, the long-run time frame (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test of the difference between time frames I and III in difference between choices in the 
individual and group settings, p = 0.07). This result can be driven by the fact that the patient 
messages could be able to convince participants to choose more patient options even in the 
short-run time frame. 
Result 3: With communication, participants choose more patient options and tend to become 
less present-biased when deciding for a group. 
 Effects of others’ preferences and communication 
Beyond showing the difference between intertemporal choices made for oneself and for 
a group, this study also tries to figure out the possible underlying explanations for these 
differences: influences of others’ preferences and communication among members. In this 
section, I examine therefore the effects of other group members’ choices (i.e., revealed 
preferences) and messages on decisions for a group. Hence, I focus on changes in choices 
overall. 
Let us start with situations in which participants chose the intermediate options (option 
2 and option 3) in the individual setting, as from there participants could change their choices 
4. Speaking of Patience 
 78 
for a group in both directions, more or less patiently. Table 4-4 shows linear regressions of 
the extent of choice changes in the group setting from the individual setting. The explanatory 
variables are the five dummies that correspond to each combination of others’ choices in the 
individual setting. As participants can only observe other members’ choices and consider 
whether or not to conform to those choices, others’ preferences are likely to be considered in 
relative terms, i.e., whether other members are more, equally or less patient. The base 
category is all three members being equally patient. The explanatory variables also include 
the dummies that represent each type of messages as described in the previous section. The 
cases with impatient messages are dropped from the analysis, because only one participant 
sent the impatient message. Thus, there is only one participant each in the case of ‘patient and 
impatient messages’ and ‘twisted and impatient messages’. 
Since quite an amount of participants receive ‘Twisted messages’, which suggest 
receivers to be impatient when the interest rate is low and then to switch to be patient when 
the interest rate is high, it is important to have interactions between each message type and 
interest rates in the regressions. 
With regards to others’ preferences, Table 4-4 (model I) shows that only more patient 
others (in the first case) have a significant positive relationship to the changes in choices in 
the group setting. On the other hand, the negative correlation of less patient others and choice 
shifts is not significant (the second case). In all remaining cases, others’ preferences do not 
have any significant correlation with choice shifts. 
Now let us turn to the effects of messages on choice shifts from choices for oneself to 
choices for a group in model (I). The complete relationship between each type of messages 
and the choice shifts is the sum of the coefficients of each message type dummy and its 
corresponding interaction term with interest rate. I begin with ‘patient message’ when (1) 
participants receive only messages suggesting to choose the patient option or (2) they receive 
patient and neutral messages. The positive coefficients of the dummy and the interaction term 
would mean that ‘patient message’ always leads to a more patient option when decisions are 
made for a group than when decisions are made for oneself. This effect is, however, not 
significant. 
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Table 4-4: OLS regressions of changes in choices in the group setting for situations when options 2 
and 3 were chosen in the individual setting 
Dependent Variable   Changes in choices 
Model   (1) (2) 
All 'more patient' others (dummy) 
 
0.37*** 
(0.13) 
0.37*** 
(0.12) 
All 'less patient' others (dummy) 
 
-0.33 
(0.27) 
-0.30 
(0.28) 
One 'more patient' and one 'less patient' others (dummy) 
 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
One 'more patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy) 
 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
One 'less patient' and one 'equally patient' others (dummy) 
 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
Interest rate 
 
0.22 
(0.21) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
Patient message (dummy) 
 
0.10 
(0.41) 
0.13 
(0.41) 
Twisted message (dummy) 
 
-2.20*** 
(0.58) 
-2.10*** 
(0.56) 
Patient and twisted message (dummy) 
 
-0.73 
(0.49) 
-0.77 
(0.46) 
Patient message * Interest rate 
 
0.33 
(0.29) 
0.31 
(0.30) 
Twisted message * Interest rate 
 
1.38*** 
(0.43) 
1.35*** 
(0.42) 
Patient and twisted message * Interest rate 
 
0.85*** 
(0.30) 
0.90*** 
(0.30) 
Option 3 chosen (dummy) 
 
-0.44*** 
(0.10) 
-0.44*** 
(0.09) 
Female 
 
 0.14* 
(0.08) 
Age 
 
 0.01 
(0.04) 
Monthly expenditure 
 
 <0.001 
(<0.001) 
Constant 
 
1.17*** 
(0.31) 
0.91 
(0.83) 
    No. of groups 
 
35 35 
No. of observations 
 
569 569 
R2   0.2811 0.2876 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered on the 
group level in parentheses. 
 
Next I look at the case of ‘twisted messages’, in which (1) participants receive only 
messages saying that they should be impatient when the interest rate is low and be patient 
when the interest rate is high or (2) they receive the twisted and neutral messages. The sum of 
the coefficients of the dummy (-2.20 in model I) and the interaction (1.38 in model I) suggest 
that when the interest rate is lower than 59%14, which is the first four interest rates, choices 
for a group are significantly shifted toward a less patient option. On the contrary, when the 
interest rate is larger than 59%, which is the last interest rate, choices for a group are shifted 
                                                   
14 This interest rate is the threshold for the interest rate that will make no shift. This interest rate is calculated by the 
ratio of the coefficient of the dummy to the coefficient of the interaction term and then minus 1.  
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toward the more patient direction. These findings indicate that the ‘twisted messages’ are also 
persuasive. 
In the combining case of patient and twisted messages, the sum of dummy coefficient 
and interaction coefficient is always positive for all interest rates in this study. There is no 
switching point anymore. This means that patient messages have somewhat higher influence 
than twisted messages on choices for a group. 
Now I turn to situations in which participants chose the least patient option (option 1) 
and the most patient option (option 4) in the individual setting. In the following analysis, the 
difference between the average of others’ choices and one’s own choice (in the individual 
setting) is used to represent other members’ preferences relative to one’s own preference. 
This implies that other members can only be more or equally patient in the former situation, 
while they can only be less or equally patient in the latter situation. The dummies of each 
message type as well as their interaction terms with interest rate on choice shifts are also 
included in the regressions for these situations. 
Table 4-5 (model I) shows that starting from the least patient option (option 1) in the 
individual setting, others’ preferences have a insignificant positive effect on the choice shift 
in the group setting. Messages have more effects than others’ preferences in this situation. 
‘Twisted message’ is convincing with the threshold interest rate of 22.0%, meaning that a 
more patient option is chosen when the interest rate is higher than 22.0%, which is the last 
three interest rates. In the ‘Patient and twisted messages’ case, the threshold interest rate 
becomes lower, namely only 18.2%, indicating that patient messages can convince 
participants to choose a more patient option at a lower interest rate compared to a pure 
‘twisted message’ case. 
In situations, in which the most patient option (option 4) was chosen in the individual 
setting, Table 4-5 (III) shows that others’ preferences do not play a role in choice shifts from 
choices made for oneself to choices made for a group. ‘Patient messages’ prevent participants 
in this situation from becoming less patient when deciding for a group compared to when 
deciding for oneself. ‘Twisted messages’ are also persuasive in the sense that choices are 
shifted impatiently only at the first four interest rates, not at all interest rates. When patient 
and twisted messages are combined, only choices at the first interest rate are shifted 
impatiently. Taken together, patient messages are more persuasive than twisted messages 
when choices are made for a group. 
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Table 4-5: OLS regressions of changes in choices in the group setting for situations when the least or 
the most options were chosen in the individual setting 
Dependent Variable   Changes in choices: 
Option 1 (least patient) 
Changes in choices: 
Option 4 (most patient) 
Model   (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Difference between an average of others' choices 
and one's own choice 
 0.21 
(0.16) 
0.15 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Interest rate  -1.59*** 
(0.26) 
-0.99** 
(0.46) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
Patient message (dummy)    0.40*** 
(0.14) 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
Twisted message (dummy)  -8.15*** 
(1.98) 
-7.85*** 
(1.60) 
-1.05*** 
(0.32) 
-1.06*** 
(0.30) 
Patient and twisted message (dummy)  -11.97*** 
(0.82) 
-11.50*** 
(0.81) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
Patient message * Interest rate  - - -0.17* 
(0.08) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
Twisted message * Interest rate  6.68*** 
(1.86) 
6.57*** 
(1.57) 
0.63*** 
(0.19) 
0.62*** 
(0.18) 
Patient and twisted message * Interest rate  10.13*** 
(0.63) 
10.77*** 
(0.62) 
0.13* 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
Female   0.93*** 
(0.30) 
 -0.06 
(0.05) 
Age   0.11 
(0.12) 
 -0.007 
(0.008) 
Monthly expenditure   <0.001 
(<0.001) 
 <0.001 
(<0.001) 
Constant  2.42*** 
(0.50) 
-0.42 
(2.33) 
-0.33*** 
(0.12) 
-0.20 
(0.20) 
      No. of groups  26 26 35 35 
No. of observations  102 102 871 871 
R2   0.3196 0.4831 0.0941 0.0975 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered on the group level in parentheses. 
 
To sum up, the influences of all message types on choices for a group are consistent for 
all choices made in the individual setting with patient messages being most persuasive. All 
results are robust when socio-economic control variables are included as shown in Table 4-4 
(II) and Table 4-5 (II) and (IV). This is consistent with the communication hypothesis. 
Result 4: Preferences of other group members seems to be persuasive when choices are made 
for a group only when both group members are more patient than the decision maker. 
Result 5: Communication plays a significant role when choices are made for a group. Patient 
messages are most influential compared to other types of messages. 
 The role of communication across subject pools 
As a similar experiment was conducted with Thai coastal villagers (Boonmanunt, 
Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss, 2017)(Chapter 3), the findings across subject pools can be 
compared. The most significant difference of the results across subject pools is the role of 
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communication in the group setting. While communication does not have any additional 
effect on choices for a group on top of others’ preferences among coastal villagers, it plays a 
tremendous role on the choices made for a group of university students. A possible 
explanation could be that students are more familiar with communication by exchanging 
written messages, while this is uncommon among villagers. For future studies, a more 
appropriate way to study communication in such a subject pool like villagers still has to be 
found. This method should give villagers or people with a limited literacy more comfort in 
communication while guarantee anonymity at the same time, which might have not been 
given in Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017). 
4.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study compares intertemporal decisions made for oneself and for a group of Thai 
university students. I also examine two possible factors that underlie decisions on behalf of a 
group in an intertemporal context: other members’ time preferences and communication 
between members, as in Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017). In line with 
Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017), I find that choices made for a group are 
significantly more patient than those made for oneself. Both channels contribute to the 
changes in choices for a group from choices for oneself, but in different ways. 
Other members’ preferences lead to changes in choices for a group from choices for 
oneself only when other members are more patient than the decision maker. While all types 
of messages are persuasive, patient messages have the largest influence on choices for a 
group. It might be that social desirability of patience causes this asymmetric conformity 
toward patience. As discussed in Boonmanunt, Lauer, Rockenbach and Weiss (2017) 
patience is sometimes considered to be a desirable trait across regions and cultures. For 
example, proverbs from different parts of the world encourage people to be patient, as do 
various religions and philosophers.15 This conjecture connects this study to the study by 
Bolton, Ockenfels and Stauf (2015), which also finds asymmetric conformation in risky 
contexts. They find that decision makers tend to adjust their decisions toward risk aversion 
when they learn that a passive player is more risk-averse. On the other hand, decision makers 
do not adjust their decisions when a passive player is less risk-averse. This suggests 
                                                   
15 In the Bible, it is stated, for example, that “Be patient toward all men”. Buddha said also, for example, “And 
invulnerable armor is patience”. Proverbs from different parts of the world tell people to be patient. For instance, a German 
proverb says, “Patience is a bitter plant, but it has sweet fruit”. A Chinese proverb says, “Patience and the mulberry leaf 
becomes a silk gown”, and a Kanuri proverb says, “At the bottom of patience is heaven”. 
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asymmetric conformation toward risk aversion. Taken together, both risk aversion and 
patience might be considered socially desirable behaviors. 
To sum up, the difference between intertemporal decisions for oneself and for a group 
due to an asymmetric conformation bias toward patience in university students is in line with 
the findings in coastal villagers. This suggests that these results are robust in a more standard 
subject pool without any experience of intensively being in groups in the real world. 
For future research, it would be interesting to investigate the influence of others’ 
preferences on choices for oneself to get better understanding about conformity in 
intertemporal contexts. Furthermore, extending this research to children subject pool might 
provide possible interventions that make children be more patient.  
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4.7 Appendix A: The theoretical framework 
Present-biased time preference can be modeled with a simple functional form as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997).  
 (A4.1) 
where  is the discount function; 𝑘  is time period;  is a discount factor; and  is a 
parameter for present-biased preference with .  corresponds to the case of 
standard exponential discounting. The one period discount factor between the present and a 
future period is , while the one period discount factor between two future periods is . By 
including present-biased preferences into a standard intertemporal utility function, we get the 
following total utility function: 
 (A4.2) 
Assume a time-separable CRRA utility function16, in which the utility depends on the 
monetary payoff. In addition, there are only two time periods or dates that an agent has to 
allocate a given budget to (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Andreoni et al., 2015; Lührmann et 
al., 2014). The utility function has the following form: 
 (A4.3) 
where  is the amount allocated to the sooner date, while  is the amount allocated to the 
later date. The parameter 𝛼 captures the curvature of the utility function. 
Agents are assumed to maximize their total utility over time subject to the budget 
constraint, 
 (A4.4) 
where  is the gross interest rate,  is the budget. 
Maximizing (3) subject to (4) gives the following conditions: 
 
(A4.5) 
where  is an indicator for whether  Rewriting the equation by substituting 𝑥%'( = 𝑌 −𝑃𝑥% (from equation (4)) gives: 
                                                   
16 The CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function:  
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 (A4.6) 
This Equation (6) tells us that the higher present bias parameter 𝛽 and/or the higher 
discount factor 𝛿 leads to the higher fraction of the budget which is allocated to the sooner 
date 𝑥%. 
For parameter estimation, take log to equation (5): 
 (A4.7) 
 
We extend the model described in Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) to capture the 
situation when decisions also affect others. 
  Assume that there is an agent 𝑖 who is delegated to decide for the whole group. Agent 𝑖’s decision is binding for all the other group members and 𝑖 cares about the utility of the 
other group members (𝑥O). The other group members could have the same, more patient or 
less patient time preferences than 𝑖. 
  Agent 𝑖  has parameters 𝛿. , 𝛽.  and 𝛼. . The group member with the same time 
preference as 𝑖 has parameters 𝛿[(= 𝛿.), 𝛽[(= 𝛽.) and 𝛼[(= 𝛼.). The group member who is 
more patient than 𝑖 has parameters 𝛿\, 𝛽\ and 𝛼\. The group member who is less patient than 𝑖 has parameters 𝛿], 𝛽] and 𝛼]. Agent 𝑖 can observe the decisions made by the others before 
making decisions for the group. 
  Agent 𝑖 includes the utilities of the others into the calculation with weights for each 
type of others as follows: 𝜔. for 𝑖’s own utility, 𝜔[ for the utility of a member with the same 
time preference, 𝜔\ for the utility of a member who is more patient than 𝑖, and 𝜔] for the 
utility of a member who is less patient than 𝑖. Hence, agent 𝑖 makes decisions based on a 
weighted utility function. 
  There are four main possible cases regarding agent 𝑖’s time preferences compared to 
others’ preferences. 
Case 1: Agent 𝑖 does not care about the utility of the others according to the standard theory. 
The weights for the others are zero. Agent 𝑖 decides indifferently for a group than for oneself. 
Case 2: All types exist in the group, which means that 𝑖’s time preference lies between the 
most and the least patient members. 
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𝑈. = 𝜔. 𝑥.,%_ + 𝛽.%`𝛿.(𝑥.,%'(_ + 𝜔[ 𝑥.,%_ + 𝛽.%`𝛿.(𝑥.,%'(_a[=b[c.,[c\,[c]  +	 𝜔\ 𝑥\,%_ + 𝛽\%`𝛿\(𝑥\,%'(_d\=b\c.,\c[,\c]  
+ 𝜔] 𝑥],%_ + 𝛽]%`𝛿](𝑥],%'(_e]=b]c.,]c[,]c\  
(A4.8) 
with 𝛽\%`𝛿\( > 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( and 𝛽]%`𝛿]( < 	𝛽.%`𝛿.(. 
In our setting, 𝑖’s decision is binding for all group members (𝑥O), so the payoffs are the 
same for all the members: 
 𝑥%O = 𝑥.,% = 𝑥[,% = 𝑥\,% = 𝑥],% and 𝑥%'(O = 𝑥.,%'( = 𝑥[,%'( = 𝑥\,%'( = 𝑥],%'(. 
To simplify the model, assume that agent 𝑖 includes each type of other members with a 
representative. The weighted discounted utility is as follows: 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔[ ⋅ 𝑢[ + 𝜔\ ⋅ 𝑢\ + 𝜔] ⋅ 𝑢], (A4.9) 
where 𝜔 = 1	and 𝜔. = 𝜔[. 
Maximizing the weighted utility (9) in the case that all types exist, subject to the budget 
constraint: 𝑃𝑥%O + 𝑥%'(O = 𝑌, gives the following condition. 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	((𝜔. + 𝜔[)𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]() ijki (A4.10) 
Agent 𝑖 decides more patiently for a group than for oneself: g6h5678h 	< 	 565678, 𝑃 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]( ijki < 𝑃𝛽.%`𝛿.( ijki, 0 < 𝛼 < 1 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]( > 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\𝛽\%`𝛿\( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]( > 1 − 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 
Assume that 𝛽\%`𝛿\( = 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝐶 and 𝛽]%`𝛿]( = 	𝛽.%`𝛿.( − 𝐶; 𝐶 is a constant. 𝜔\ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝐶 + 𝜔] 𝛽.%`𝛿.( − 𝐶 > 1 − 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\C + 𝜔]𝛽.%`𝛿.( − 𝜔]𝐶 > 1 − 𝜔. + 𝜔[ 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\ + 𝜔] 𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔\ − 𝜔] 𝐶 > 𝜔\ + 𝜔] 𝛽.%`𝛿.( 𝜔\ − 𝜔] 𝐶 > 0 𝜔\ > 𝜔] 
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Agent 𝑖 decides more patiently for a group than for oneself, when 𝑖 weighs the more 
patient type more heavily than the less patient type, 𝜔\ > 𝜔]. And the opposite is true. 
Agent 𝑖	decides therefore more (less) patiently for groups when 𝑖  weighs the more 
patient type more (less) heavily than the less patient type. 
Case 3: Agent 𝑖 is the most patient member. 
 Case 3.1: Without any same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔] ⋅ 𝑢]	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	(𝜔.𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]() ijki 
 Case 3.2: With a same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔[ ⋅ 𝑢[ 	+ 𝜔] ⋅ 𝑢]	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	((𝜔. + 𝜔[)𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽]%`𝛿]() ijki 
Agent 𝑖 decides less patiently for a group than for oneself when 𝑖 is the most patient 
member in the group when 𝜔] > 0. 
 
Case 4: Agent 𝑖 is the least patient member 
 Case 4.1: Without any same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔\ ⋅ 𝑢\	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	(𝜔.𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽\%`𝛿\() ijki 
 Case 4.2: With a same patient member 𝑈. = 𝜔. ⋅ 𝑢. + 𝜔[ ⋅ 𝑢[ 	+ 𝜔\ ⋅ 𝑢\	 
FOC: g6h5678h = 𝑃	((𝜔. + 𝜔[)𝛽.%`𝛿.( + 𝜔]𝛽\%`𝛿\() ijki 
Agent 𝑖 decides more patiently for a group than for oneself when 𝑖 is the least patient 
member in the group when 𝜔\ > 0. 
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4.8 Appendix B: Design for time-preference elicitation 
 
Table 4-6: Design for time-preference elicitation  
 (sooner 
date) 
 (delay) 
days 
 (gross 
interest rate) 
Standardized 
daily rate (%) 
Annual rate (%) 
0 14 1.05 0.37 217.57 
0 14 1.11 0.76 714.41 
0 14 1.25 2.58 3598.47 
0 14 1.43 3.71 12564.12 
0 14 2 5.08 100479.55 
     
0 28 1.05 0.18 85.67 
0 28 1.11 0.38 226.29 
0 28 1.25 0.80 795.98 
0 28 1.43 1.28 2116.61 
0 28 2 2.51 11574.99 
     
14 14 1.05 0.37 217.57 
14 14 1.11 0.76 714.41 
14 14 1.25 2.58 3598.47 
14 14 1.43 3.71 12564.12 
14 14 2 5.08 100479.55 
 
Note: The effective annual interest rate is quarterly compounded. 
  
€ 
t
€ 
k
€ 
P
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Table 4-7: Complete decisions 
No. Payment dates Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
𝑡  
(sooner 
date) 
𝑘  
(delay 
days) 
𝑃  
(gross 
interest rate) 
1 
TODAY 285 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
2 
TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
3 
TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
4 
TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
5 
TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 2 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
         
6 
TODAY 285 Baht 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.05 
7 
TODAY 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.11 
8 
TODAY 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.25 
9 
TODAY 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 1.43 
10 
TODAY 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 0   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  28 2 
         
11 
in 2 WEEKS 285 Baht 190 Baht 95 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.05 
12 
in 2 WEEKS 270 Baht 180 Baht 90 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.11 
13 
in 2 WEEKS 240 Baht 160 Baht 80 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.25 
14 
in 2 WEEKS 210 Baht 140 Baht 70 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 1.43 
15 
in 2 WEEKS 150 Baht 100 Baht 50 Baht 0 Baht 14   
AND in 4 WEEKS 0 Baht 100 Baht 200 Baht 300 Baht  14 2 
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4.9 Appendix C: Choices and measures of time preferences in M1 and 
M3 treatments 
 
Table 4-8: Choices and measures of time preferences in M1 and M3 treatments 
 M1 M3 
For 
oneself 
For a 
group 
For 
oneself 
For a 
group 
Overall 3.49 3.69 3.34 3.46 
Time frame I (today,+2wks) 3.46 3.70 3.4 3.54 
Time frame II (today,+4wks) 3.34 3.61 3.18 3.33 
Time frame III (+2wks,+4wks) 3.67 3.76 3.45 3.53 
Measure of present bias 0.2 0.06 0.05 -0.01 
Measure of discounting 3.67 3.76 3.45 3.53 
 
Choices in the individual setting are not significant different between M1 and M3 
treatments overall and for every time frame (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p-values are 0.28 
overall and 0.63, 0.52 and 0.31 for time frames I, II and III, respectively). Choices in the 
group setting are also not significantly different between M1 and M3 overall and for every 
time frame (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p-values are 0.25 overall and 0.48, 0.49 and 0.48 
for time frames I, II and III, respectively).  
The measures of time preferences between M1 and M3 in both individual and group 
settings are not significantly different (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p-values are 0.28 for 
individual present bias, 0.45 for individual long-run discounting, 1 for present bias in the 
group setting and 0.48 for long-run discounting in the group setting). 
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4.10  Appendix D: Parameter estimates of the utility functions 
The decisions made in the experiment are used to estimate the utility parameters, 
namely the utility function curvature, α, discounting, δ, and present bias, β. First, we use the 
ordinary least squares regression based on Equation (A4.7) as a linear model. However, there 
is a problem at the corner solutions that the allocation ratio ln 565678  is not well defined. To 
address this issue, the non-linear least squares regression, based on Equation (A4.6) as a 
demand function, is used to estimate the utility parameters. 
Nevertheless, for the estimation, those participants who did not alter their choices at all 
(i.e., always choosing the same options across 15 decisions) are dropped out, since no 
variation in choices make it insufficient for the estimation. For decisions in the first round, 19 
participants showed no variation in their choices. For decisions in the second round, 
additional 15 participants are dropped. 
Estimates of parameters for choices in the individual setting 
Aggregate estimates 
The aggregate estimates of parameters from choices in the individual setting by the 
NLS regression are more evidence for present bias on the aggregate level. The aggregate 
estimate of β is 1.38, which is larger than 1.00, and the difference is statistically not 
significant (Wald test, p = 0.15). On the other hand, the aggregate estimate of δ is 1.00 and is 
not significantly different from 1 (Wald test, p = 0.46). This suggests again that the longer 
time span in this experiment does not have an effect on decisions for oneself. 
The aggregate estimate of α, which captures the curvature of the utility function, is 0.84 
and significantly differs from 1 (Wald test, p < 0.001). This indicates that the utility function 
is not linear, but concave. 
Individual estimates 
Figure 4-1 shows the distribution of the estimates for β from the choices in the 
individual setting by the NLS regression. Variation in the β estimates is to be seen with the 
peak at 1.00. The individual estimates for β do not differ significantly from 1 (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p = 0.24). 
Figure 4-2 shows the distribution of estimates for individual δ. The values concentrate 
well on 1, and they are not significantly different from 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 
0.55). 
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Figure 4-1: Estimates for β from choices in the 
individual setting 
Note: Four subjects are dropped out in this figure, since they 
have very high Beta. 
 
Figure 4-2: Estimates for δ from choices in the 
individual setting 
Note: Two subjects are dropped out in this figure, since they 
have very high Delta 
Estimates of parameters for choices in the group setting 
Since participants are informed about the options that their group members chose in the 
individual setting and in some group members exchange messages, the estimates for the 
parameters used thereafter are at the group level in order to retain the independency of 
observations. 
Aggregate estimates 
Table 4-9 shows that on aggregate, α is significantly smaller than 1, which means the 
utility function is non-linear but concave. The estimate for β in the individual setting is 
smaller than 1, which means that present bias exists, significantly in the Group treatment. The 
estimate for β for a group is larger than β for oneself, suggesting that present bias decreases. 
Participants are less present-biased on average. Aggregate estimates for δ are around 1 in 
both rounds in all treatments. 
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Table 4-9: Aggregate utility parameter estimates by NLS regressions 
  Group Message Control 
  Individual 
(1) 
Group 
(2) 
Individual 
(3) 
Group 
(4) 
Individual 
(5) 
Individual 
(6) 
β 0.94 
(0.03) 
0.95 
(0.03) 
0.98 
(0.03) 
1.00 
(0.02) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
1.01 
(0.02) 
δ 1.00 
(0.002) 
1.00 
(0.002) 
1.00 
(0.001) 
1.00 
(0.001) 
1.00 
(0.002) 
1.00 
(0.001) 
α 0.81 
(0.03) 
0.83 
(0.03) 
0.88 
(0.01) 
0.92 
(0.01) 
0.83 
(0.03) 
0.88 
(0.02) 
       No. of clusters 49 18 39 13 25 25 
Observations 734 660 585 435 375 375 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5611 0.471 0.4974 0.5711 0.5789 0.5617 
       H0: β = 1 F = 2.96 
p = 0.09 
F = 3.17 
p = 0.09 
F = 0.82 
p = 0.37 
F = 0.00 
p = 0.97 
F = 0.26 
p = 0.62 
F = 0.34 
p = 0.56 
H0: δ = 1 F = 0.28 
p = 0.60 
F = 1.18 
p = 0.29 
F = 0.46 
p = 0.50 
t = 4.91 
p = 0.05 
F = 2.7 
p = 0.11 
F = 6.26 
p = 0.02 
H0: α = 1 F = 56.32 
p < 0.001 
F = 36.97 
p < 0.001 
F = 63.84 
p < 0.001 
t = 124.30 
p < 0.001 
F = 31.10 
p < 0.001 
F = 36.46 
p < 0.001 
 
Individual estimates 
Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show the distributions of the estimates for β in the Group and 
Message treatments, respectively. The distributions of β estimates from decisions in the 
group setting seem to converge to 1. However, only the difference between β estimates in the 
individual and group settings in the Message treatment is weakly significant (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p = 0.056 for Message treatment, p = 0.32 for Group treatment and p = 0.82 
for control treatment). 
 
Figure 4-3: Estimates for β from choices in the 
Group treatment 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Estimates for β from choices in the 
Message treatment 
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Figure 4-5: Estimates for δ from choices in the 
Group treatment 
 
Figure 4-6: Estimates for δ from choices in the 
Message treatment 
 
The estimates for δ in the individual and group settings are weakly significantly 
different in the Group and Message treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.06 for 
Group treatment and p = 0.09 for Message treatment) and are not significantly different in the 
control treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.36). 
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